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Current accounts of the demand and supply of secured debt and asset
securitization are in stark contrast with observed debtor behavior.
Whereas current theories predict a strong preference for secured debt,
debtors borrow on an unsecured basis whenever possible. In addition, the
purported theoretical similarities between secured debt and asset
securitization, that both forms of financing generate savings by pledging
collateral, conflict with the significant disparity in the popularity and
signals associated with use of asset securitization and secured debt. This
Article addresses the disconnects between current theories and observed
practices by considering the effects of the agency costs associated with
corporations and the risk-aversion associated with non-corporate forms of
business enterprises on the demand for secured debt. Integrating agency
costs and risk-aversion into the debtor decision between secured and
unsecured debt suggests a strong bias against secured debt because free
assets serve as a safety mechanism for managers similar to Jensen's theory
with respect to free cash flow. An analysis of the supply of secured debt
and asset securitization illustrates that a significant, if not primary,
element of both species offinancing is the radically different way in which
secured debt and asset securitization attempt to decrease the likelihood of
debtor insolvency. Focusing on this crucial difference explains the
disparity in popularity between the forms of financing by suggesting that
secured debt is ideally suited for financially marginal debtors but ill-suited
for financially healthy debtors.
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Introduction
A fundamental tool of corporate finance is the stratification of debt.
Debtors may arrange creditors into priority classes by entering into
covenants or granting security interests. Federal bankruptcy law preserves
this hierarchy of creditors by granting full priority to secured creditors
with respect to encumbered assets.' The recent innovation of asset
securitization represents the most radical form of such debt prioritization.
Through asset securitization, a firm can remove assets from the scope of
bankruptcy proceedings by selling them to a special purpose vehicle-an
entity unaffected by the financial status of the firm itself.
2
This Article addresses two anomalies surrounding debt and asset
securitization, one old and one relatively new. The old anomaly centers on
the contrast between the theoretical benefits provided by secured debt and
the observed use of secured debt. Secured debt permits a debtor to
concurrently use an asset as a business input and as collateral to decrease
the debtor's costs of capital. Moreover, scholars have long recognized that
secured debt presents opportunities for debtors to redistribute risks and
profits-to the benefit of themselves and secured creditors, and to the
detriment of unsecured creditors.' Indeed, recent scholarship has
emphasized this strategic element of secured debt to the point of
recommending an overhaul of the current federal bankruptcy system's full
priority regime.4 But empirical observations contrast starkly with the
theoretical advantages of secured debt. First, debtors borrow on an
unsecured basis whenever possible.5 Second, there is little, if any,
observed interest rate differential between secured and unsecured loans.6
This disconnect between debtors' observed aversion to secured debt and its
theoretical benefits suggests that the traditional analysis of secured debt is
incomplete or inaccurate.
The new anomaly concerns the conceptual similarities between
secured debt and asset securitization, and the differences in the popularity
1 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
2 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FrN. 133,
135 (1994).
3 See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 30-33 (1981).
4 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
5 See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REv. 625,
629 (1997).
6 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47
DuKE L.J. 425, 448 (1997).
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between the two forms of financing. Many commentators have
characterized asset securitization as merely an extreme form of secured
debt.7 Both forms of financing seem to be driven by a debtor's use of
collateral to ensure payments to creditors in case of insolvency. Yet, asset
securitization has proven to be a tremendously popular vehicle for
financing,' while debtors avoid secured debt whenever possible.9
Moreover, use of secured debt carries a negative signal,'0 while use of
asset securitization does not." This deep disparity in the usage patterns
and signals associated with secured debt and asset securitization,
especially in light of the purportedly identical mechanics of the two forms
of financing, strongly suggests that the current conceptualization of the
relation between secured debt and asset securitization is also incomplete or
inaccurate.
This Article addresses these anomalies by constructing a new model
for the demand for secured debt-one that includes both the agency costs
associated with corporations and the risk-aversion associated with non-
corporate businesses. This Article also addresses the supply of secured
debt and asset securitization, an area often neglected in discussions
pertaining to the patterns of use of secured debt and asset securitization.
Integrating agency costs and risk-aversion into the debtor decision
between secured and unsecured debt suggests a strong bias against secured
debt because free assets, like free cash flows, provide a safety mechanism
for managers." Managerial bias against secured debt may be so strong as
to occasion an inefficiently low level of secured debt. Moreover, the
resulting decrease in managerial discipline created by a surplus of free
assets compounds the costs associated with an inefficient aversion to
secured debt.
An analysis of the supply of secured debt and asset securitization
suggests that the observed preference for unsecured debt may be efficient
with respect to healthy firms. The popular emphasis on secured debt and
asset securitization's similarities ignores a significant, if not primary,
distinction between the two species of financing-the radically different
ways in which secured debt and asset securitization decrease the likelihood
of debtor insolvency. Focusing on this crucial difference explains the
disparity in popularity between the forms of financing by suggesting that
secured debt is ideally suited for financially-marginal debtors but ill-suited
7 E.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76
TEX. L. REv. 595 (1998).
8 Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 133.
9 See Mann, supra note 5, at 629.
10 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 450 n. 107.
11 Id. at 463.
12 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323 (1986).
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for financially-healthy debtors. Conversely, asset securitization is not only
better suited for financially healthy debtors, it also represents a first-best
solution for healthy debtors because it does not involve the trade-off
between fiscal efficiency and agency costs that is inherent to the choice
between secured debt and unsecured debt.
In Part I, I address the demand for secured debt. I begin with a review
of the current theories of debtors' demand for secured debt, and develop a
new theory by incorporating agency costs and risk aversion into the
analysis of debtors' choice between secured and unsecured debt. I then
employ this theory to address several tensions in the current treatment of
secured debt. In Part II, I address the supply of secured debt. By
comparing the costs and benefits of secured debt to marginal and healthy
debtors and the costs and benefits of asset securitization and secured debt
to financially healthy debtors, I illustrate the radically different ways in
which secured debt and asset securitization address the problem of debtor
insolvency and the equally dramatically different effects such strategies
have on financially healthy and financially marginal debtors. I use insights
from these comparisons to address various issues raised by the current
treatment of asset securitization and secured debt. In Part III, I address the
ramifications of the developments discussed in this Article to bankruptcy
law.
I. The Demand for Secured Debt
A. Current Theories on the Demand for Secured Debt
1. The Uneasy Case for Full Priority
In a perfectly competitive debt market, creditors are only able to
charge interest rates that cover their economic costs. The interest rates that
creditors charge are tied to the probability of default and the amount
recoverable upon default. Under a bankruptcy regime that accords security
interests full priority, secured claims reduce the pool of funds available to
unsecured claims. All other things equal, a debtor with encumbered assets
is likely to incur a higher interest rate for unsecured loans than a debtor
without encumbered assets.
But the previous analysis only functions if creditors are able to adjust
interest rates after debtors encumber their assets. This assumption was
questioned by Bebchuk and Fried, who note the existence of "non-
adjusting creditors"-creditors who do not adjust the interest rate they
Yale Journal on Regulation
charge in response to a debtor's encumbering its assets. 3 The presence of
non-adjusting creditors in a full-priority bankruptcy system provides
debtors with the opportunity to redistribute wealth from unsecured
creditors to secured creditors. Assuming that the credit market is not
completely saturated with debtors with fully-encumbered assets, a debtor
can transfer wealth from previous unsecured, non-adjusting creditors by
fully encumbering its assets, or at least achieving a level of asset-
encumbrance greater than the market average. The debtor obtains funds at
a secured rate and does not have to compensate the non-adjusting creditors
for their higher level of risk.
The redistributional effects of secured loans under a full priority
regime create distortions in the financing decisions of debtors that lead to
inefficient security interests. 14 A firm will issue a security interest when
the benefits it receives from doing so outweigh the costs. This private
decision-making rule is only efficient from a societal perspective,
however, when there are no externalities resulting from the firm's
decision-when it can capture all the benefits and internalize all the costs
flowing from a security interest. Since full priority permits firms to pass
some of the costs of security interests to non-adjusting creditors, debtors
do not confront the full costs of security interests. They may grant secured
loans that decrease general, but increase their personal welfare. Full
priority, when accompanied by non-adjusting creditors, may lead to
security interests that are merely redistributional and even wealth-
decreasing from a societal perspective.
2. The Easy Case for Full Priority
Steven Schwarcz responds to Bebchuk and Fried by emphasizing the
costs of granting security interests for purely redistributional reasons. 5
Schwarcz refers to the total costs of granting a security interest as "Theta,"
and he contends that, for most debtors, Theta is sufficiently high to
undermine the viability of purely redistributional security interests.16
Schwarcz discusses three principal elements of Theta. First, a debtor
that fully encumbers all its assets faces a significant opportunity cost of
having fewer assets available to pledge as collateral in the case of a
liquidity crisis. 17 Second, fully encumbering all assets sends a negative
signal to the business community about the viability of the debtor's
13 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 4, at 882. Specifically, private involuntary creditors,
government and regulatory agencies, voluntary creditors with small claims, and "rationally-ignorant"
voluntary creditors are non-adjusting creditors. Id.
14 See id. at 896.
15 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 425-26.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 446-48.
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business."8 Finally, secured debt is based on liquidation value, while
unsecured debt is based on cash flow.19 Liquidation value is equal to the
discounted value of a debtor's existing assets, whereas cash flow includes
the anticipated income of the company. If the company is a wealth-
creating enterprise, then cash flow should eclipse liquidation value.
Even incorporating the redistributional effects of security interests,
Schwarcz contends that the Theta of most debtors overwhelms the benefits
of prematurely encumbering all assets for redistributional purposes.
Although Schwarcz does not base his inferences on direct empirical
evidence for this claim and concedes that direct empirical support would
be difficult to isolate,2 ° Schwarcz argues that the relative dearth of security
interests supports his claim.2' Specifically, empirical studies have
indicated that debtors that can obtain financing on an unsecured basis do
not generally incur secured debt.22 Attacking the issue from a different
angle, Schwarcz observes that the interest rate differential between secured
and unsecured loans is relatively small. If a lender is comfortable lending
to a debtor on an unsecured basis, the debtor is unlikely to receive any
benefit from encumbering its assets. 4
An apparent empirical contradiction to Schwarcz's assessment of
Theta is found in non-recourse debt, such as project financing, asset
securitization, and other forms of structured financing transactions. Such
debt is usually backed by collateral,25 even when issued by healthy
corporations that otherwise borrow on an unsecured basis. Schwarcz
explains this anomaly by arguing that the differences between non-
recourse debt and full-recourse debt indicate that Theta is low for non-
recourse debt. First, because non-recourse debt does not apply to all of a
debtor's assets, but only to specific assets, it leaves the remainder of a
debtor's assets as a source of collateral in case of a liquidity crisis.
26
Second, non-recourse debt does not carry the reputational costs of secured
debt because it is widely recognized as a viable means for healthy
companies to attract capital. 27 Finally, creditors for non-recourse debt lend
against cash flow, not liquidation value.28
18 Id. at 450 n.107.
19 Id.
20 See id. at 448.




25 Id. at 463.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 463-64.
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3. General Remarks
Aside from the merits of both Bebchuk and Fried's and Schwarcz's
arguments, 9 their debate prompts several preliminary remarks. First, both
sides focus exclusively on the pledge of collateral in discussing secured
debt and the effects of secured debt. However, in addition to providing
collateral in the case of debtor insolvency, secured debt affords creditors
with substantial power to regulate debtor behavior, thereby decreasing the
likelihood of debtor insolvency or at least decreasing the probability that a
secured creditor will be involved when a debtor becomes insolvent.
30
Indeed, several scholars have contended that the value of secured debt is
derived primarily from its preventive powers instead of the value of
pledged collateral.3 ' Insofar as the debate between Bebchuk and Fried and
Schwarcz neglects this significant, perhaps primary, quality of secured
debt, it may prove to be an ancillary or irrelevant discussion (depending on
the distribution of benefits to secured creditors between receiving
collateral and controlling debtor behavior) in the analysis for the demand
for secured debt.
Second, the debate focuses exclusively on the demand for secured
debt. While partial-equilibrium analyses are generally valid, an analysis of
the supply of secured debt is especially relevant to the immediate debate
because the issue itself assumes that debtors have a meaningful choice
between secured and unsecured debt. Anecdotal observations suggest that,
with respect to financially unhealthy debtors, this may not be the case,32
and a rigorous analysis of the supply of secured debt may suggest that
secured debt is not a viable financing strategy for financially healthy
debtors,33 rendering the debate moot.
Finally, the debate between Bebchuk and Fried and Schwarcz is
artificially discrete. Specifically, neither argument accounts for the impact
of the debtor's financial status or the debtor's current level of
encumbrance in discussing the demand for secured debt.
29 I will discuss their analyses in Section I.C.
30 See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory ofSecured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,
950 (1986).
31 E.g., Mann, supra note 5, at 640-41.
32 See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2030-31 (1994); Schwarcz, supra
note 6, at 442.
33 I will provide such an analysis in Section l.B.
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B. Reassessing the Demand for Secured Debt in the Context ofAgency
Costs
1. Agency Costs of Corporations
One of the fundamental costs associated with corporate business
enterprises is the cost created by the different goals of a firm's owners,
such as shareholders, and its managers. Shareholders desire to maximize
firm value34 and are risk neutral with respect to the returns on any specific
corporation because they can diversify their holdings among different
corporations.35 Managers, however, seek to maximize their benefits from
working for the shareholders, meaning that they will attempt to receive the
most utility for the least amount of work. Insofar as shareholders are able
to tie managers' benefits to the success of the firm, managers' interests are
to maximize firm welfare.36 Managers are not risk-neutral with respect to
the firm that they manage for at least two reasons. First, much of any
manager's human capital is firm-specific. Thus, managers cannot shift
from one firm to another without significant costs. Second, managers may
draw psychic pleasures from the mere act or status of managing a firm. To
the extent that such psychic pleasures are unique to a specific firm, then
managers will suffer a loss even if they are able to become managers at a
different firm. With respect to non-firm-specific pleasures from leading a
firm, managers may still incur a loss if they cannot obtain another
management position or another management position of similar
responsibility or perceived prestige upon the dissolution of the corporation.
These tensions between the interests of management and shareholders
generate two inefficiencies in the operation of the corporation from the
perspective of the shareholders. First, if shareholders cannot perfectly
match management compensation to corporation performance, then
management will not capture all of the benefits of its efforts, and it will
have an incentive to work at a suboptimal level, or shirk. Shirking results
in suboptimal returns for the shareholders. Second, irrespective of
management's efforts, the shareholders will still receive suboptimal results
because of management's divergent risk tolerance. Because shareholders
are risk-neutral, they would desire management to invest in any projects
that have an expected positive net present value. Yet, management is risk-
averse, and it will therefore invest in positive net present value projects,
but not to the extent that shareholders desire. Rather, management will
34 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-06 (1976).
35 See id. at 306.
36 See id.
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attempt to operate the firm in such a manner that the firm provides a
positive return on investments while still maintaining a certain safe level
of risk. The costs generated by these tensions between the interests of
management and shareholders are collectively referred to as "agency
costs.
3 7
Agency costs are a significant factor in the demand for secured debt
because both of the ways in which secured debt generates savings in the
cost of capital-by increasing the expected return in case of default
through a pledge of collateral, and by decreasing the likelihood of default
through covenants-significantly impede management's ability to shirk
with impunity. Since management is the corporation's representative in
negotiating agreements for secured debt, these factors suggest that agency
costs may cause a strong bias against secured debt.
2. Agency Costs and Collateral
a. Jensen's Free Cash Flow Theory
Michael Jensen observed that one of the manifestations of corporate
agency costs is an inefficient surplus of cash.38 In order to maximize
returns, shareholders desire that managers invest corporate funds in all
available positive net present value projects.3 To the extent financially
feasible, managers should return surplus funds to shareholders by issuing
dividends or debt.40 Additionally, a relative dearth of cash has a
disciplinary effect on management.41 It creates less of a margin for error
and compels managers to exert more effort to generate returns, if not to
appease shareholders (so as to retain their positions), than to maintain the
solvency of the firm.
In contrast, managers have an incentive to retain an extra amount of
cash beyond levels necessary to fund positive net present value projects
(what Jensen termed "free cash flow").42 Free cash flow can be employed
in inefficient ventures (meaning projects with a negative net present value)
or inefficient organizational or financial schemes.4 3 The latter possibility is
relevant to the current discussion. Managers have several incentives for
37 See id. at 317.
38 Jensen, supra note 12, at 323.
39 Id. at 324.
40 Id.
41 Shareholders only want a "relative" dearth of cash because they still desire that a firm
maintain sufficient liquidity to efficiently fund day-to-day operations and positive net present value
investment opportunities.
42 Jensen lists greater power associated with a larger corporation, greater compensation and
creation of additional managerial positions as reasons for free cash. Id. at 323.
43 Id.
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keeping free cash flow on hand. First, the cash creates a safety cushion in
case of an economic downturn or an exogenous negative event. While
shareholders can protect themselves against such contingencies through
diversification, management is effectively tied to a single corporation.
Second, a cash surplus creates margins for managerial misbehavior.
Managers can employ free cash flow to obfuscate shirking by applying the
cash to any deficits. Moreover, a cash surplus allows management to
ameliorate the negative impacts of shirking on the solvency of the firm.
b. Free Assets as a Substitute for Free Cash
Jensen's free cash flow theory provides a powerful insight as to why
corporations might not tend to encumber assets. Although granting
security interests may be in the best interests for the profitability of a
corporation," management has a strong reason to resist such interests
because unencumbered assets can provide management with relatively
cheap access to capital. First, as Schwarcz suggests, if a firm encounters
financial difficulties, managers can employ secured loans to quickly raise
funds. Second, managers may also employ secured loans to raise funds to
obfuscate the effects of shirking. Finally, the availability of secured loans
itself may qualify as a benefit to managers because it creates security with
respect to the continuing survival of the corporation and hence their
continued status as managers. Thus, free assets can serve as substitutes to
Jensen's free cash flow. As managers will attempt to retain free cash flow,
they may also attempt to retain free assets.
Jensen's theory also illuminates a deep lacuna in Schwarcz's analysis.
Just because management could store liquidity in free assets does not mean
that management will elect to do so. If free assets and free cash flow are
strong substitutes, then management could elect to prematurely encumber
assets and hold any extra wealth generated from secured loans in the form
of cash. Schwarcz's observation that free assets are a source of liquidity is
not sufficient to support an affirmative theory of why management will not
prematurely encumber its assets. Schwarcz's analysis is incomplete
because it does not explain why management would elect to employ free
assets over free cash flow to preserve excess wealth. My explanation for
this under-encumbrance of assets-what I will term the "Sub-Optimal Use
Theory"-must also articulate why free assets are better reservoirs for
wealth, from the perspective of agency costs, than free cash flow.
A crucial distinction, then, between the Sub-Optimal Use Theory and
Schwarcz's analysis is that the Sub-Optimal Use Theory posits an
44 1 am currently only considering the demand for secured loans. My analysis of the supply
dimension will suggest ambiguous conclusions regarding the efficiency of secured loans.
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inefficient existence of free assets, whereas Schwarcz posits an efficient
existence of free assets. Insofar as free assets replace or augment free cash
flow, they are instances of agency costs. By leaving free assets,
management is inefficiently financing the operations of the corporation in
order to provide benefits to itself. Schwarcz correctly observes that free
assets serve as a source of liquidity, but he neglects to consider the
possibility of an inefficient abundance of free assets. Management may
refrain from encumbering some assets in order to efficiently protect
against a liquidity crisis; however, it may also refrain from encumbering
all assets to provide a safety mechanism for itself by inefficiently reducing
the riskiness of the corporation and obscuring the effects of shirking.
c. Free Assets Preferred Over Free Cash Flow
Several aspects of free assets recommend them as a device for
reducing agency costs over free cash flow from the perspective of both
management and shareholders. Management and shareholders share
aligned but converse goals with respect to agency costs. The ideal
mechanism for extracting agency costs for managers would be one that is
difficult for shareholders to detect, and provides management with a great
benefit while imposing little cost on the shareholders. Conversely, the
ideal concession for shareholders would be difficult (and possibly
inefficient) for management to monitor, and would provide management
the most benefit while creating little cost for the shareholders.
Inefficient cash surpluses are more observable than inefficient free
assets in two ways. First, public records and corporate records provide a
clearer account of available cash than they do for free assets. Public
corporations must disseminate financial statements to shareholders on a
quarterly basis. Shareholders can also determine any corporation's
available cash relatively easily by requesting to view its financial records.
In contrast, while secured creditors must create public filings for any assets
they wish to encumber,45 this signal is ambiguous because a public filing
indicates only a possibility of encumbrance. Creditors may create public
filings for assets that they have not encumbered or may never encumber.46
To specifically verify a corporation's free assets, shareholders must review
debt agreements between the corporation and creditors.
Second, the decision to create a secured loan involves more factors
than the decision to maintain a certain level of free cash. Deciding between
the appropriate level of free cash and the appropriate level of free assets
involves two common sets of decisions related to the optimal liquidity
45 See U.C.C. § 9-502 (2001).
46 See id.
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level of a corporation. First, both decisions involve a judgment concerning
a corporation's necessary capital reserves. Second, both decisions require
managers to determine how they may efficiently convey excess wealth to
shareholders. Yet, deciding on the optimal level of free assets involves a
third and unique set of decisions-assessing the costs of granting a
security interest. Secured loans often involve significant transaction costs
because of necessary negotiations. More importantly, secured loans often
entail collateral-specific covenants to protect the value of the creditor's
security interest. The costs of these covenants (in terms of the debtor's
responsibility to monitor the collateral or the limitations on the debtor's
ability to operate its business) may overwhelm any savings that result from
decreased interest rates.
But both of these costs, and especially the cost of covenants or other
terms of a secured loan, are not observable by shareholders because they
require specific knowledge of the firm's operations and the firm's relation
with creditors. Additionally, management may not only obfuscate the
effects of secured loans from shareholders, it most likely affects such
terms. The terms of secured loans are negotiated between management and
debtors. This provides management with two strategies for biasing the firm
against secured loans. First, management may artificially inflate the
interest rates of such loans by refusing to grant optimum covenants with
respect to the collateral. The second and converse strategy is to create
artificially draconian terms for secured loans by under-representing the
firm during negotiations. Such strategies are effective because
shareholders rarely monitor negotiations for secured loans. Together, these
aspects of secured loans provide management with greater latitude in
explaining the presence of free assets over explaining the presence of free
cash flow.
With respect to management discipline, the effects of free cash and
free assets appear to be identical in terms of the ratio of benefits to
management and costs to shareholders. Both free cash flow and free assets
allow management some latitude for shirking. However, the unique
dynamics surrounding the valuation of secured loans provides free assets
with an advantage over free cash flow. Creditors incorporate the risk of
default and the expected return in the event of default into the interest rates
that they charge. Consequently, a healthy debtor borrowing on a secured
basis would enjoy less of a benefit than an unhealthy debtor borrowing on
a secured basis, because a healthy debtor's unsecured rate would not be
significantly different from its secured rate. Empirical observations seem
to support this conclusion by indicating that interest rates for unsecured
and secured loans do not vary much for financially healthy creditors. 47 If
47 See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 448.
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unsecured loans command only a small premium over secured loans, then
the costs to shareholders for free assets are relatively small. However, the
benefits to management are substantial because management effectively
gains a safety mechanism against unemployment.
3. Agency Costs and General and Financial Covenants
a. Secured Debt and Debtor.Behavior
Secured creditors regulate debtor behavior through a battery of
covenants in the security agreement, 8 which can be classified into two
groups-"financial covenants" and "general covenants." Financial
covenants require the debtor to meet certain financial performance targets,
such as achieving a certain level of earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization expenses ("EBITDA") or maintaining a
certain ratio of EBITDA to debt or assets to debt, on a quarterly and/or
annual basis.49 The failure to meet such financial targets could trigger an
increase in interest rates or constitute a default under the security
agreementf 0 General covenants directly limit the debtor's ability to engage
in certain activities. For example, a security agreement may prohibit the
debtor from acquiring additional secured or unsecured debt, engaging in
sale-leaseback transactions, or selling certain assets or assets over a certain
value without first acquiring the secured creditor's consent.5 1 Failure to
observe general covenants will often also constitute an event of default
under the security agreement. 2
Financial and general covenants work with security interests to
empower the secured creditor. Once a debtor violates a financial or general
covenant, the debtor may be deemed to have defaulted under the security
agreement. A default provides a secured creditor with the ability to
immediately demand the principal and accrued interest under the secured
loan, and the power to foreclose on collateral if the debtor is unable to
pay. 3 If the collateral is crucial to the debtor's business, the threat of
foreclosure provides the secured creditor with significant power to shape
the debtor's future behavior (i.e., by decreasing the debtor's likelihood of
insolvency). Alternatively, the secured creditor may collect the sum due
48 See, e.g., ALLIANCE IMAGING, INC., PROSPECTUS 66 (2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/817135/000091205701525446/a2055312z424b4.txt (last
visited Apr. 26. 2002).
49 See, e.g., id.
50 See, e.g., id.
51 See, e.g., id.
52 See, e.g., id.
53 See, e.g., id.
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from the debtor or foreclose on the pledged collateral if the secured
creditor does not believe that the debtor can remain solvent. From
management's perspective, both the manner in which financial and general
covenants function, and the nature of the benefits that both types of
covenants generate further decrease the attractiveness of secured debt.
b. The Costs of Covenants to Management
Financial covenants and general covenants impose significant costs to
management because they create an effective monitoring system for
management performance. Financial covenants serve as a direct
monitoring device for the debtor's performance, which provides an
indicator of management's performance. A secured creditor has greater
incentives, vis-A-vis individual shareholders, to diligently monitor a debtor
since it has a significant interest in the financial health of the debtor.
Furthermore, the secured creditor specializes in monitoring debtors. This
specialization increases the secured creditor's incentives to monitor the
debtor because it decreases the secured creditor's costs of monitoring
(because the fixed costs of monitoring may be spread across a large pool
of debtors to whom the creditor has lent funds). More importantly, this
specialization makes the secured creditor's monitoring more effective, as
the secured creditor has amassed experience and expertise in interpreting
financial information. Finally, the secured creditor's monitoring may serve
as an alarm system to shareholders for poor management performance. If
management's failure to meet a financial covenant triggers an event of
default, then management may have to publicly disclose such default if the
corporation files public disclosures under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 4
General covenants complement financial covenants by limiting
management's ability to obfuscate negative results. If a fiscal quarter
results in poor financial results, management may sell assets, acquire
additional debt, or engage in sale-leaseback transactions to generate
additional liquidity. General covenants impede this strategy by requiring
management to obtain the secured creditor's consent before engaging in
any such financing arrangements. At best, management must negotiate
with the secured creditor, thereby alarming the secured creditor to its
manipulative intent. At worst, the secured creditor may prohibit such
strategies altogether by refusing to consent to such measures. Again,
secured creditors can effectively enforce general covenants because they
have expertise in monitoring debtors, and they have the appropriate
54 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b)(5), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (current version
at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(j)(b) (West. Supp. 2002)).
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incentives to enforce general covenants because of their significant interest
in the debtor's financial solvency.
c. Agency Costs and Covenants
The robust monitoring regime established by financial and general
covenants-and the managerial discipline created by such a regime-seem
to indicate that borrowing on an unsecured basis instead of a secured basis
may not be a viable agency cost due to the significant benefits that
shareholders must forsake. However, as with the case of collateral-specific
covenants, management may diminish the attractiveness of secured debt
because of its role in negotiating financial and general covenants. First,
management may decrease the effectiveness of financial and general
covenants by negotiating savings in interest rates for decreased
monitoring. A second and converse strategy is to under-represent the
debtor in negotiating the financial and general covenants and then argue
that a secured loan is not viable because the costs of compliance with the
covenants overwhelm the savings in the interest rate differential.
More importantly, while financial and general covenants may exert
significant managerial discipline, the benefits of this discipline are muted
for a financially healthy corporation and, therefore, unobservable to its
shareholders. The purpose of financial and general covenants is to ensure
the debtor's ability to repay the secured loan. As the debtor's financial
health increases, the effect of these covenants decreases, not because of a
decrease in managerial discipline, but because the initial probability of
debtor insolvency is lower. For example, assume that a regime of financial
and general covenants decreases the likelihood of debtor insolvency by
half. A debtor that has a 90% probability of insolvency would only have a
45% likelihood of insolvency after being subject to this set of covenants
(an absolute decrease of 45%). However, a debtor that has a 10%
probability of insolvency would still have a 5% chance of insolvency after
management observes the set of covenants (an absolute decrease of 5%).
This disparity in the effect of financial and general covenants translates to
a disparity in the interest rate differential between secured and unsecured
loans. Consequently, at least for healthy debtors, borrowing on an
unsecured basis instead of a secured basis is a viable agency cost because
the costs to shareholders (in terms of lost savings) are relatively low. In the
case of borrowing on a secured basis, the monitoring costs to shareholders
are relatively high due to management's role in negotiating secured loans.
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4. The Impact of Agency Costs on the Demand for Secured Debt
Managers are predominantly the individuals who develop the
financing strategies of a firm. Consequently, the appropriate determinant
of the demand for secured debt is the opportunity cost to management,
given constraints imposed by shareholders. As discussed, the opportunity
cost to management for encumbering assets is a function of the
opportunity cost to the frrm for encumbering assets, reduced by the extent
that management does not internalize the firm's costs and benefits, and by
the direct costs to management's ability to shirk. Both of these values shift
according to the level of encumbrance. As more assets are encumbered,
the opportunity costs to the firm increase. Although possessing a certain
threshold amount of available collateral in case of a liquidity crisis might
be crucial to a firm's survival, the value of additional unencumbered
collateral beyond such a minimum level would decrease quickly. Indeed,
beyond a certain point, possessing available assets to serve as collateral in
case of a liquidity crisis may be redundant or inefficient.55 Similarly, a
signal of financial troubles might only be given after a certain level of
encumbrance, and a certain level of encumbrance may drastically increase
the costs of unsecured debt. These considerations suggest that the slope of
Theta either increases geometrically in relation to the amount of
encumbered assets or has one or more kinks in its rate of increase. (See
Figure 1.)
Analytical considerations also suggest that the costs to management
increase as the level of encumbrance increases. First, insofar as free assets
are substitutes for free cash flow, greater encumbrance yields fewer
opportunities for management shirking. This suggests that the costs to
management should increase geometrically or should experience several
kinks in the rate of increase because the managerial benefits of free assets
become concentrated in fewer and fewer assets as the level of
encumbrance increases. For example, when a firm's assets are free of any
liens, one portion of such assets may serve as a reservoir of value to
obfuscate management shirking, another may serve as a reservoir of value
to obscure the effects of an economic downturn, and yet another may serve
as a source of liquidity in case of a liquidity crisis. At a high level of
encumbrance, all of these functions may be focused on one portion of the
firm's assets, dramatically increasing the cost to management of
encumbering that asset. Second, the constraints imposed by covenants on
managerial behavior should increase as the level of encumbrance
increases. Secured creditors may insist on less stringent or less pervasive
429
55 I will discuss the ramifications of this possibility in Part III of this Article.
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general or financial covenants if the security interest covers only a fraction
of a firm's assets. More importantly, a substantial amount of
unencumbered assets provides management with an implicit escape from
covenants because it allows management to enter into a subsequent
secured loan (which would be used to fully pay-off the current secured
loan) in case of an impending default under the current loan.
Graphically, the opportunity cost of secured debt to management can
be represented by a curve, plotted against the firm's level of encumbrance,
which I refer to as the "Alpha Curve." The first component of the Alpha
Curve is a modified version of Schwarcz's Theta Curve. Because
management's utility calculus determines the opportunity costs of secured
debt, the Theta Curve must be adjusted for the degree to which
management internalizes the value of the firm.56 I refer to this derivative
curve as the Delta Curve. The second component of the Alpha Curve,
which I refer to as the Kappa Curve, represents the direct costs to
management of encumbering additional assets based on the firm's current
level of encumbrance. (See Figure 2.)
At the extreme level of full encumbrance, management's and
shareholders's interests are aligned, creating an amplified effect with
respect to the opportunity costs associated with full encumbrance. This
region represents the area where Schwarcz notes that encumbrance of
assets is detrimental for a firm because it denies a firm funding in case of
liquidity crises. Yet, beyond a certain level, shareholders may desire that
management encumber assets (hence, Theta and Delta dip into the
negative region). However, the benefits to management of borrowing on
an unsecured basis eclipse the negative detractors for shareholders, to the
degree internalized by management (the positive magnitude of Kappa is
greater than the negative magnitude of Delta), creating the observed effect
that debtors will borrow on an unsecured basis whenever possible.
The Sub-Optimal Use Theory can also incorporate a third dimension
to the Alpha Curve-the debtor's financial health. (See Figure 3.) As a
debtor's financial status wanes, the cost to both managers and shareholders
of issuing debt on an unsecured basis increases. This is due to an
expanding disparity in the interest rates of unsecured and secured loans as
the financial status of the debtor worsens. For highly risky debtors, secured
financing may be the only form of debt available. 7 The confluence of
strong benefits from secured debt and the necessity of funding for a
financially-weak firm pushes the Alpha Curve into the negative region.
56 This is a separate cost from the costs to the firm because management, due to its firm-
specific capital, values the firm's existence independently from the firm's value.
57 Harris & Mooney, Jr., supra note 32, at 2030-31; Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 442.
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4. Sub-Optimal Use of Security Interests in the Context of Sole
Proprietorships and Partnerships.
In assessing the possibility of sub-optimal use of security interests in
sole proprietorships and partnerships,58 it is necessary to distinguish
among three cases. In the first case, a proprietorship or partnership may be
managed and owned by the same individual or individuals. In the second, a
proprietorship or partnership may be owned and managed by different
persons, with the ownership concentrated in one or several individuals.
Finally, a proprietorship or partnership may have dispersed ownership. If
efficient operation of a firm is judged by maximizing returns on capital, it
is likely that there will be a sub-optimal use of security interests in each
case.
The case most similar to a corporation is a proprietorship or
partnership with dispersed owners. The dispersed owners, like
58 Certain closely-held corporations may behave more like one of these classes of firms, and
the analysis of these firms would apply accordingly.
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shareholders, lack the proper incentives to appropriately monitor the
proprietorship or partnership because each owner will be unable to fully
capture all the benefits of its monitoring activities. If the manager is not an
owner of the firm, then the case is virtually identical to a corporation, and
the agency problems previously discussed apply. Even if one of the owners
manages the proprietorship, agency costs will arise because the managing
owner is unable to capture all of the benefits of his efforts, and the
managing owner has interests in the continuation of the business because
of the firm-specific human capital and psychic pleasures discussed
previously. Consequently, the managing owner will also have strong
incentives to shirk and will possess interests divergent from those of other
owners.
The antipode to the corporation is a proprietorship or partnership in
which the owners are also the managers. This type of firm avoids the
agency costs associated with the corporation because the managers and
owners are identical. Because management captures all of the benefits of
59its efforts, the problem of shirking does not arise.
However, this type of firm does not provide the benefits of risk
neutrality created by dispersed ownership. The wealth of manager-owners
is often concentrated in the managed firm. Unlike a shareholder of a
corporation, a manager-owner's wealth is not diversified among many
firms. Consequently, the manager-owner is risk-averse with respect to the
solvency of the managed firm. Even if the manager-owner or manager-
owners have dispersed assets, they would still prefer the survival of the
managed firm because of specific investments of human capital and
psychic pleasures from managing the firm. This risk aversion would
generate an inefficient level of risk in the firm's financing choices. With
respect to financially healthy firms, manager-owners would prefer free
assets over free cash because they would cost the firm little (due to a small
disparity between interest rates of secured and unsecured loans) and afford
the manager-owners insurance against the insolvency of the firm.
In the case of a proprietorship or partnership with concentrated
ownership and distinct owners and managers, sub-optimal use of secured
loans is likely to arise because of insufficient monitoring or risk aversion.
If the owner or owners of a firm have their wealth concentrated in the firm,
they will exhibit management's risk-averse behavior with respect to the
behavior of the firm. If the owner or owners have dispersed wealth, they
are unlikely to monitor management well, creating managerial
opportunism. In either case, there is a strong possibility for an inefficient
level of free assets.
59 In the case of a partnership, shirking may still exist because each partner-manager may
not capture all the benefits of his labor, but this point only enhances the argument that sub-optimal use
of security interests is likely even in firms where managers are significant owners.
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C. Review of the Current Debate
1. Critique of the Uneasy Case
Bebchuk and Fried mount an interesting case for the possibility of
purely redistributive security interests; however, their argument involves
several analytical and empirical difficulties. Empirical evidence seems to
contradict Bebchuk and Fried's analysis of the strategic opportunities
presented by nonadjusting creditors, and the analysis does not seem
feasible when considered from a multi-iterative perspective.
a. Empirical Inconsistencies
Bebchuk and Fried argue that the existence of nonadjusting creditors
presents debtors with an opportunity to profit from redistributing wealth
from unsecured creditors to themselves and to secured creditors; however,
the empirical evidence does not seem to support this claim. If this claim
were true, debtors would have a powerful incentive to fully encumber all
their assets. More specifically, we would expect to find that debtors with a
greater number of nonadjusting creditors have a greater amount of secured
debt. On a general level, however, the empirical data does not support, but
actually contradicts, Bebchuk and Fried's argument: Empirical
observations indicate that debtors obtain unsecured debt whenever they
can, and only employ secured debt if it is the only available means of
financing. 6° An even stronger criticism is that empirical data also
contradicts the specific prediction of Bebchuk and Fried's analysis.
Because of their number of employees, trade creditors and tort and
regulatory claims, large corporations would likely benefit most from
redistributive security interests because they have the highest
concentration of nonadjusting creditors. However, large corporations
borrow almost exclusively 61 on a non-secure basis.62 Consequently,
empirical studies afford Bebchuk and Fried's analysis little, if any,
support. Of course, the empirical evidence does not rule out the possibility
that the incentives for strategic security interests are present but eclipsed
by countervailing pressures.
60 See Mann, supra note 5, at 629; Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 446 n.91.
61 Much of the exception constitutes non-recourse debt, which Schwarcz has suggested
should be considered differently from full-recourse secured debt.
62 See Mann, supra note 5, at 629.
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b. Ex Ante and Multi-Iterative Problems
In addition to its empirical problems, Bebchuk and Fried's analysis of
redistributive security interests does not appear to be stable, at least with
respect to voluntary nonadjusting creditors. Redistributive security
interests are possible if voluntary nonadjusting creditors charge a pooled
interest rate reflecting a weighted average of the distribution of asset
encumbrance among debtors. Bebchuk and Fried rely on an ex post, single
iteration analysis to conclude that debtors may exploit this pooled interest
rate by fully encumbering their assets. From an ex ante perspective,
however, this analysis does not hold. If creditors are sophisticated, they
will anticipate such strategic behavior and charge an interest rate that
reflects a fully encumbered debtor. This ex ante strategy on the part of
unsecured creditors does not rely on any specific knowledge of the debtor.
Rather, the creditor only needs to understand the possibility of strategic
behavior on the part of the debtor. Either the debtor is already fully
encumbered (in which case the interest rate would be accurate), or (if
Bebchuk and Fried are correct) the debtor has an incentive to become fully
encumbered, in which case the interest rate would be correct on an
expected basis.
But even without assuming sophisticated creditors, Bebchuk and
Fried's analysis is still not viable on a multi-iterative basis if the credit
market is perfectly competitive. In a perfectly competitive market, firms
will only recover a competitive rate of return beyond their costs. If, as
Bebchuk and Fried claim, debtors transfer wealth from unsecured creditors
to themselves, then debtors are increasing the costs to unsecured creditors.
If unsecured creditors are unsophisticated and do not anticipate these
increased costs, then they will exit the market. The ultimate result is that
debtors will no longer be able to borrow on an unsecured basis (because of
a lack of unsecured creditors), or they will only be able to borrow from
creditors charging an interest rate reflecting a fully liened firm (because
only such an interest rate would cover an unsecured creditor's costs, given
redistributive security interests). Both possibilities eliminate the
opportunity for strategic behavior with respect to nonadjusting, voluntary
creditors.
c. The Paradox of Secured Debt
Although Bebchuk and Fried's conclusions are ultimately dubious,
their analysis raises several important issues. Foremost, Bebchuk and
Fried's analysis emphasizes the classic puzzle concerning secured debt.
When creditors are nonadjusting, secured debt appears incredibly
attractive to debtors. Bebchuk and Fried extend this observation into a
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concern about the impact of the theoretical desirability of secured debt on
the behavior of debtors. However, debtors have continuously expressed an
aversion to secured debt. This suggests that an additional, countervailing
factor exists in the demand for secured debt, in the supply of secured debt,
or in both. Second, the equilibrium problems encountered by Bebchuk and
Fried suggest a credibility problem for firms seeking unsecured debt:
Because sophisticated creditors realize that debtors can dilute the worth of
their debt by encumbering assets, debtors issuing unsecured debt must be
able to credibly signal that they will not prematurely secure their debt.
2. Critique of the Easy Case
Although Schwarcz raises an interesting response to Bebchuk and
Fried's attack on full priority, his argument is ultimately flawed because of
difficulties in his assessment of Theta and his overall strategy in
responding to Bebchuk and Fried. Schwarcz implicitly treats a debtor's
decision to encumber its assets as a binary decision between no
encumbrance and full encumbrance, whereas the reality is a continuum
between these two extremes. This conceptual misstep renders Schwarcz's
entire conceptual framework consistent with Bebchuk and Fried's theory.
a. Binary Treatment of Theta
Schwarcz's general strategy in replying to Bebchuk and Fried is
undermined by his implicit reliance on a binary decision between full
encumbrance and no encumbrance. Bebchuk and Fried argue that debtors
have an incentive to engage in purely redistributional security
arrangements in which they encumber assets beyond the level incorporated
into the fixed interest rates charged by non-adjusting creditors.
Consequently, a response to Bebchuk and Fried must demonstrate why
debtors do not have an incentive to encumber their assets above the level
reflected in interest rates charged by non-adjusting creditors.
Unfortunately, Schwarcz's theory only seems to demonstrate why debtors
would not want to encumber all of their assets. Schwarcz's analysis is
erroneously binary with respect to the availability of collateral, the
signaling effect of security interests and the trade-off between cash flow-
based loans and liquidation value-based loans.
A debtor's assets are not either available or unavailable in case of a
liquidity crisis. Rather, the most common case is some point on a
continuum between these two extremes. For example, a debtor may have
half or most of its assets encumbered. Similarly, the signal created by a
security interest might differ based on where the debtor lies along the
continuum of encumbrance. A security interest which encumbers 10% of a
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debtor's assets would not signal financial insolvency as much as a security
interest encumbering 99% of a debtor's assets would. Finally, a debtor is
free to borrow through a mix of unsecured and secured loans and can
therefore select an optimal balance between borrowing against cash flow
or liquidation value (if the debtor must select between the two forms of
borrowing at all). In reconciling the proliferation of non-recourse debt with
his assessment of Theta, Schwarcz recognizes that encumbrance is not a
binary state, observing: "Non-recourse financing is not particularly
troublesome in this regard because it only encumbers a specific portion of
the debtor's assets, such as a pool of financial assets in the case of
securitization, or one of a utility's power plants in the case of project
finance. 63 Yet, Schwarcz's treatment of security interests in general does
not incorporate the point that security interests can also be asset-specific.
The nonlinear progression of Theta creates a gap within Schwarcz's
theory which is sufficient to accommodate the strategic behavior described
by Bebchuk and Fried's analysis. As long as they operate below a certain
threshold level of encumbrance, debtors may engage in redistributional
security interests and still leave a certain amount of assets unencumbered
in case of a liquidity crisis or to avoid alarming unsecured creditors about
financial problems. Though Schwarcz argues that Theta is sufficiently high
at the point of full encumbrance to deter redistributional security interests,
he must also establish that Theta is sufficiently high to deter
redistributional security interests in the range of encumbrance where
redistributional activities are possible. Schwarcz's reply to Bebchuk and
Fried seems to answer the wrong question.
The nature of Theta also illustrates an exegetical void in Schwarcz's
account of the demand for secured debt. Schwarcz observes that debtors
who can borrow on an unsecured basis will generally do so.64 Indeed,
anecdotal data indicates that debtors are so biased against secured loans
that they are willing to sacrifice interest rate savings of one or two percent
in order to avoid encumbering assets.65 Yet, Schwarcz's analysis only
demonstrates that debtors will only borrow on a secured basis up to the
point where Theta outweighs the benefits of a secured loan.66
63 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 463.
64 See id. at 446.
65 See Mann, supra note 5, at 658 & n.129.
66 Three strategies are available to create complete consistency between Schwarcz's theory
and his observations. First, Schwarcz could illustrate that the optimal level of secured debt is no
secured debt for most debtors, that is, Theta always overwhelms the benefits of borrowing on a secured
basis with respect to creditors. Second, Schwarcz could augment his analysis by delineating additional
factors aside from the value of Theta that would cause debtors to refrain from encumbering assets.
Third, Schwarcz could shift his analysis to a supply-side consideration and argue that the costs
associated with secured debt from the secured creditor's perspective are so high that they eliminate
most or all benefits of secured debt to debtors.
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b. Inconsistent Analysis of Non-Recourse Financing
Just as Schwarcz's analysis of full-recourse debt is too narrow, his
treatment of non-recourse debt appears overly generous. Schwarcz
attempts to differentiate the effects of full-recourse and non-recourse debt
by emphasizing the limited nature of non-recourse debt. Yet, non-recourse
debt has the same potential for diluting unsecured creditors' claims as full-
recourse debt. Just like a security interest, non-recourse debt involves a
debtor removing certain assets, whether they are accounts receivable,
inventory or the expected returns from a venture, from the pool of assets
available to unsecured creditors as part of a financing transaction. For
example, a debtor might securitize its accounts receivable or its inventory
and significantly reduce the pool of resources available to unsecured
creditors in case of bankruptcy. At the extreme limit, a debtor might
securitize all of its assets, which would essentially duplicate, at least from
an unsecured creditor's perspective, full encumbrance.67 Because certain
forms of non-recourse debt create bankruptcy remote entities, the impact
of non-recourse debt on unsecured creditors may be even more negative
than a security interest because the bankruptcy estate has no method of
accessing assets conveyed to a bankruptcy remote vehicle. Moreover, the
scope of the debt is limited by the amount loaned by the creditor. The
Uniform Commercial Code only allows a creditor to claim the amount that
it loans.68
Schwarcz supports his assessment that non-recourse debt does not
possess the negative signaling effects of security interests by citing the
growing popularity of asset securitization.69 However, this observation
does not support his assessment for several reasons. First, the fact that
asset securitization is one of the fastest growing trends in the financial
sector does not necessarily mean that asset securitization does not create a
negative signal to other creditors. Second, even assuming that non-
recourse debt does not create a negative signal to creditors, Schwarcz's
observation may still be purely coincidental. In other words, although non-
recourse debt may create a negative signal to creditors, the debtors that
enter such forms of financing may also possess some other trait that
eclipses the negative effects of non-recourse debt.
Finally, Schwarcz's argument that non-recourse debt relies on cash
flow instead of liquidation value seems to be overly selective. In the case
of project finance, Schwarcz argues that creditors lend on the basis of the
project's cash flow because they do not have recourse to the debtor's cash
67 There may be legal restrictions on this possibility; however, the point of the example, that
non-recourse debt involves unsecured claim dilution just as full-recourse debt does, still holds.
68 U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 1.
69 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 463 n. 170.
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flow. 70 However, this is not necessarily true. While cash flow of the
project is a component of the creditors' calculation, they are also
encumbering the assets specifically involved in the project and, therefore,
are also lending on liquidation value. Schwarcz himself implicitly
recognizes this point when he employs the example of encumbering a
power plant as part of a project finance arrangement.7 ' In the case of asset
securitization, Schwarcz seems to ignore his own definition of cash flow
when he describes assets that become cash as cash flow. 72 Schwarcz's
argument that cash flow has a greater value than liquidation value rests on
the point that cash flow incorporates the value added by the debtor to the
assets.73 When securitized assets, such as accounts receivable, are
transformed into cash, there is no value added by the debtor. Rather, the
process is more similar to the process of liquidating assets. Consequently,
certain instances of asset securitization are more appropriately analogized
to borrowing on liquidation value. While there may be crucial differences
between non-recourse and full-recourse debt, the three principal manners
through which Schwarcz differentiates the two forms of financing prove
artificial.
c. The Distinction between Secured and Unsecured Debt
While Schwarcz's analysis of the dynamics of security interests
ultimately proves unsatisfactory, he raises several important
considerations. First, unencumbered assets are a source of liquidity.
Debtors may employ unencumbered assets to generate funds during a
liquidity crisis. Consequently, they might have an incentive to refrain from
prematurely encumbering some or all of their assets. Separately, such a
decision might be efficient or inefficient. Second, Schwarcz raises the
issue of the primary distinction between full-recourse and non-recourse
debt. Schwarcz's unconvincing account of the differences between the two
forms of debt raises the question of how non-recourse debt avoids the
negative signal of full-recourse debt. Moreover, Schwarcz's assumption
that asset securitization is significantly more popular than secured debt
requires a theoretical justification.
Schwarcz's reliance on the insignificant interest rate differentials
between secured and unsecured loans and on debtors' preference for
unsecured loans to support his conclusion that Theta eclipses the benefits
of redistributional security interests merits several preliminary remarks.
First, the small difference between interest rates for unsecured and secured
70 See id. at 463-64.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 464.
73 See id. at 447.
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loans suggests that Schwarcz's analysis is focusing on the wrong side of
the equation--or at least ignoring a significant factor of the equation. In
light of the fact that secured loans guarantee returns even in the case of
bankruptcy and have at least the potential for redistributional effects, the
muted difference in interest rates is perplexing. Second, even if Theta does
eclipse the benefits of security interests, it does not mean that Schwarcz's
description of Theta is accurate. Schwarcz's description of Theta could be
inaccurate or incomplete because Theta may be comprised of an entirely
different set of considerations or because there may be additional
components to Theta that Schwarcz did not consider. Indeed, considering
the difficulties in his analysis of the costs of granting security interests,
this possibility seems highly likely.
Returning to the demand for secured debt, debtors' strong preference
for unsecured debt suggests an additional dimension to debtors' decision
process. Even though there may only be a marginal difference between the
interest rates of secured and unsecured debt, debtors should still be willing
to borrow on a secured basis because there are actual savings. More
importantly, the observed disparity between secured and unsecured interest
rates does not fully capture debtors' aversion to secured debt because
debtors have expressed a willingness to sacrifice substantial savings in
interest rates in order to borrow on an unsecured basis. These
considerations suggest one or both of the following possibilities. First,
secured debt may impose costs to debtors that are not reflected in the
interest rates (thereby transforming a marginal saving into a marginal
loss). Second, debtors' decision to borrow on an unsecured or secured
basis could be influenced by factors other than the financial impact of debt
strategy.
D. Advantages Over the Uneasy Case and the Easy Case
The Sub-Optimal Use Theory is consistent with both Bebchuk and
Fried's and Schwarcz's analyses on the demand for secured loans. It does
not replace these theories, but augments them. Insofar as Bebchuk and
Fried are correct in claiming that prematurely encumbering assets creates
redistributional opportunities, management would be optimizing
.shareholders' wealth (although not general welfare) by engaging in purely
redistributional secured loans. The Sub-Optimal Use Theory can absorb
this analytical possibility and maintain that purely redistributional security
interests will not occur. The loss to shareholders of gains from
redistributional security interests are one of the agency costs concomitant
with the benefits of dispersed ownership. Owner-managers do not
experience the agency costs of shareholders but nonetheless would select
not to engage in redistributional security interests as a symptom of their
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risk aversion with respect to the operations of the firm. There is no tension
between the current analysis and Schwarcz's description of Theta. Rather,
the current theory extends Schwarcz's insight on the liquidity
opportunities in unencumbered assets into inefficient behavior. Managers'
and shareholders' incentives are aligned up to the point where managers
efficiently maintain free assets to ensure the smooth operation of the firm.
However, beyond this threshold, managers' and shareholders' interests
diverge. Managers desire to maintain additional free assets to protect their
firm-specific investments while shareholders desire that managers
distribute any additional wealth or invest it in lucrative opportunities.
Again, the existence of inefficient reserves of free assets is a symptom of
the agency costs of dispersed ownership or the risk aversion associated
with the unification of ownership and management. By augmenting the
two prior theories, the Sub-Optimal Use Theory affords several advantages
over each theory with respect to empirical observations and analytical
cogency.
1. The Paradox of Debt
From an empirical perspective, the current theory is more exegetically
appealing than either Bebchuk and Fried's or Schwarcz's theories.
Bebchuk and Fried predict that creditors should encumber their assets
whenever possible-a prediction that contradicts observations. While
Schwarcz's theory explains why debtors may hesitate to encumber some
assets, and perhaps explains why some debtors may decide not to
encumber all their assets, it does not provide an account of why debtors
will tend to borrow on an unsecured basis whenever possible. The Sub-
Optimal Use Theory predicts the debtor behavior observed. For strong
firms, inefficiently employing unsecured loans in the place of secured
loans is an ideal agency cost from the perspective of both management and
shareholders, because the cost to shareholders is low (due to a low interest
rate differential) while the benefits to management are significant
(providing protection against firm insolvency). More importantly, the Sub-
Optimal Use Theory also predicts that security interests will be employed
by financially weak firms.
If the firm is in its initial stages and highly risky, then the interest rate
differential between unsecured and secured loans should be relatively high
(because of a higher probability of insolvency). Inefficient use of
unsecured loans is no longer a viable agency cost for either management or
the shareholders. For management, the significant interest rates of
unsecured loans create large financial burdens that may make the firm
unviable or more risky. This would threaten management's position and
compel management to borrow on a secured basis. Shareholders face a
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significantly larger cost from inefficient financing when a firm is
financially unstable. This counsels against granting management the
ability to store excess wealth in free assets.
If the firm is established but encounters financial difficulties,
management and shareholder interests still align against employing
unsecured debt. From management's perspective, financial downturns are
one of the reasons to maintain free assets. Thus, managers would want to
employ secured loans to resuscitate the firm. Since the interest rate
differential between unsecured and secured loans will increase when a firm
confronts insolvency, the costs to shareholders of permitting inefficient
unsecured debt increases significantly. This removes inefficient debt
financing as an ideal agency cost-at least until the firm returns to
stability. Through the dynamics of agency costs between management and
shareholders, the Sub-Optimal Use Theory is at least fully consistent with
observed patterns of debt use.
2. Equilibrium Issues
Several considerations also recommend the Sub-Optimal Use Theory
from an analytical perspective. Bebchuk and Fried's proposal concerning
purely redistributional security interests encounters significant analytical
problems from an ex ante perspective. Specifically, sophisticated creditors
would react to such a possibility by incorporating risks of redistributional
behavior into their interest rates (adjusting or nonadjusting). The Sub-
Optimal Use Theory addresses the ex ante concerns surrounding Bebchuk
and Fried's theory by eclipsing its ex post analysis with ex ante
considerations regarding the interaction between management and
shareholders. Indeed, from an ex post view, the conclusions that
management would allow inefficient financing schemes or that
management would prefer free assets over free cash seem counterintuitive.
Shareholders would insist that management maximize their wealth with
Bebchuk and Fried's proposed redistributional security interests. Only by
incorporating the considerations of the other party's reactions to various
strategies does the appeal of free assets over free cash become apparent.
While neither management nor shareholders may view preferring free
assets as a first-best solution, it is an ideal compromise, given the
constraints imposed by both parties' goals. Preferring free assets duplicates
the result that would obtain if management and shareholders negotiated
agency costs explicitly. Agency cost considerations also permit the Sub-
Optimal Use Theory to answer the equilibrium problems inherent in
Bebchuk and Fried's analysis. Redistributional security interests are self-
destructive because they cause interest rates to spiral towards full-
encumbrance levels. The Sub-Optimal Use Theory answers this
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equilibrium issue by blocking the possibility of purely redistributional
loans through agency costs.
More importantly, the Sub-Optimal Use Theory does not suffer from
equilibrium problems itself. The engine driving the stability problems in
Bebchuk and Fried's analysis is the juxtaposition of rational ignorance and
increasing costs from the perspective of unsecured creditors. This compels
unsecured creditors to continuously revise their pooling rates on an ex ante
or ex post basis. The Sub-Optimal Use Theory postulates rational
ignorance on the part of shareholders. The monitoring costs with respect to
financing decisions are too high to merit shareholder policing of such
decisions (especially in light of the incentive problems created by
dispersed ownership). Yet, the issue of increased costs does not arise
because shareholders' and management's incentives align when the firm
becomes financially risky. Management's interest in the inefficient
continued existence of the firm creates both the agency cost of free assets
and a self-checking mechanism that contains the levels of such agency
costs. In the case of owner-managers, an inefficient preference for
unsecured debt arises from their risk aversion. The switch to secured debt
also arises during financial distress because secured debt may be the only
viable means of resuscitating the firm.
3. A Credible Promise not to Encumber
The Sub-Optimal Use Theory holds one final analytical advantage
over redistributional security interests and the Theta explanation: It
explains how debtors can make credible promises not to engage in
redistributional strategies. Bebchuk and Fried implicitly addressed this
issue by arguing that debtors make no such promises and are free to
engage in exploitative strategies. This causes the equilibrium issues in
Bebchuk and Fried's analysis. Although Schwarcz does not address this
issue, 7 his analysis might support the response that creditors are aware
that premature encumbrance of assets creates excessively high opportunity
costs to debtors. First, this response relies on a binary treatment of asset
encumbrance. The debtor must not only show that the opportunity costs of
encumbering all its assets are too high but also that encumbering assets to
a degree that would incur a higher interest rate from the unsecured creditor
would also exact deterring opportunity costs. The second and related
objection is that debtors might not be able to disclose such information on
a cost-efficient basis. The opportunity cost of incurring secured debt is
fact-dependent. As Schwarcz's analysis of Theta illustrates, the debtor
must provide information on a myriad of issues related to the debtor's
74 See id.
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current financial status and the debtor's anticipated financial status.
Debtors may be unwilling to provide some of this information, as it may
relate to their market strategies. Moreover, such information must be
processed, and the interpretation of the information may be subject to
dispute.
Finally, even if the purely technical complications involved could be
surmounted, the issue of credibility creates a significant obstacle to
inexpensive disclosure. The unsecured creditor and the debtor possess
contrary interests in performing the calculus. The debtor would like to
overestimate the opportunity cost of granting liens so as to achieve a lower
interest rate. The unsecured creditor, however, would tend towards
conservative estimates of the opportunity costs so as to protect itself
against such a contingency. These conflicting incentives would charge the
analysis with significant suspicion from both parties.
The Sub-Optimal Use Theory addresses the credibility issue by
shifting the focus from the debtor's opportunity cost to the manager's or
owner-manager's opportunity cost of granting future liens. Creditors can
rely on the agency costs of corporations or the risk-aversion of owner-
managers because these traits are universal, not debtor-specific. Agency
costs or risk aversion align managers' and owner-managers' interests with
unsecured creditors' interests with respect to avoiding secured loans
whenever possible. Of course, debtors will tend to issue secured loans in
times of financial distress, but determining financial health is significantly
simpler than determining the opportunity costs of issuing secured debt
over a range of possibilities.
E. Sub-Optimal Use Theory and Agency Costs
1. The Strong Form and Weak Form of the Sub-Optimal Use
Theory
Agency costs (or, in the case of sole proprietorships, the costs of risk-
aversion) implicate managerial interests in the formation of fiscal strategy.
Accordingly, the first, and more obvious, class of costs arising from a
managerial bias towards free assets is inefficient financing arrangements.
Specifically, management may prefer unsecured debt arrangements over
secured debt arrangements even though the latter provides for more
benefits to the firm. Foregone savings due to lower interest rates are the
first agency cost from a managerial preference for free assets.
A more subtle and controversial cost is the benefits that covenants
under a secured loan might provide to the firm. The collateral and
covenants in a secured loan are intended not only to increase the secured
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creditor's return in the case of the debtor's default, but also to lower the
probability of debtor default.75 To the extent that the existence of a secured
loan actually increases a firm's expected profits, the costs of a managerial
bias for free assets also includes the exclusion of any such benefits.
Unsecured loans often involve covenants as well. To the extent that the
covenants of unsecured loans create some form of managerial discipline,
the net cost with respect to managerial behavior of borrowing on an
unsecured basis over borrowing on a secured basis is actually the
difference in managerial discipline between covenants for unsecured vs.
secured loans.
For any given financial state S*, managers will select an inefficient
financing scheme (at least considering the factors discussed thus far)
whenever the Alpha Curve is positive and the Theta Curve is negative.
Referring back to Figure 3, the managerial decision to keep all assets
unencumbered (as represented by a completely positive Alpha Curve) is
efficient with respect to the first twenty percent of the value of
unencumbered assets, because the Theta Curve is negative up to that point.
The second, and more subtle, cost of a managerial bias towards free
assets results from fiscal strategy's reciprocal impact on managerial
interests. Free assets are not ends unto themselves but means toward
managers' objectives of optimizing their utility. By creating a safety net
for managers to shirk responsibilities or at least dedicate a lower amount of
effort to coordinating firm activity, free assets exact a cost equal to the
difference between a firm's expected profits when management is
disciplined by the lack of free assets and a firm's profits when
management behaves under the fiscal protection of free assets. Assessing
this cost is difficult for at least three related reasons. First, the performance
of a company is affected by a large set of factors, the effects of many of
which cannot be easily isolated from the others. This creates a problem in
determining the relationship between managerial performance and benefits
to a company. Second, managers are actively attempting to obfuscate the
relationship between their performance and the company's profitability as
part of their strategy for shirking or covering conflicting interests. Finally,
managerial performance itself is caused by a complex set of factors,
making assessment of the impact of the presence or lack of one factor
difficult.
Although determining the specific costs of maintaining free assets in
any case is quite difficult, theoretical considerations permit some insight
into the nature of such costs. As a preliminary point, the effect of free
assets on management performance is not equivalent to the opportunity
costs to management from encumbering assets. These opportunity costs to
75 See Scott, supra note 30, at 950.
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management assess the decrease in management's welfare due to the
increased likelihood of insolvency and the decreased possibility of
managerial shirking generated from encumbering assets. The effect of free
assets on management performance is the cost to the firm arising from
decreased managerial performance as a consequence of the presence of
free assets.
First, the analysis so far suggests that free assets impose a cost to
firms because of deleterious effects on management, but free assets do not
confer benefits. It is difficult to understand how free assets could actually
increase managerial performance. At best, free assets might have no effect
on management, creating a zero cost to firms. Second, the cost of free
assets may change in relation to the portion of assets already encumbered.
Free assets serve as a safety net for managerial dereliction. As this safety
net decreases, the remaining portion has greater value to management.
Consequently, encumbering the first 5% of a firm's assets may have little
or no effect on managerial performance because managers have the
remaining 95% to cover shirking; however, pledging the last 5% of a
firm's assets may have a profound impact on performance because
management no longer has any free assets to generate funds in case of an
unexpected downturn. Of course, the effects of encumbering the few
remaining portions of a firm's assets may also have a muted effect on
managerial performance. Managers may have already been incentivized to
a near-optimum level of exertion by earlier decreases in free assets, and
the remaining portion could not have served as an effective safety net
against economic downturns or as an obfuscation device for managerial
shirking.
Finally, both the magnitude and the rate of increase of costs
associated with free assets are affected by the financial condition of the
debtor. For reasons previously mentioned, managers have an interest in
retaining their positions, and therefore are biased towards the survival of
the firm. Financial distress threatens this interest and incentivizes
management, decreasing much of the agency cost due to managerial
shirking. This mutes the effect of free assets on management because
management does not desire to shirk, given the current status of the firm.
A countervailing consideration is that financial distress emphasizes the
role of free assets as a safety net. However, this conflates the costs of free
assets to the firm with the opportunity costs of encumbered assets to
management. Managers derive psychic utility from the presence of free
assets because it serves as a safety net in case of an economic downturn.
Yet, free assets serve a different role in the context of decreasing
managerial performance. Free assets encourage managerial dereliction by
providing management with a safety net that serves both as a shield against
the negative effects of such dereliction on the survival of the firm and as a
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means to hide such dereliction. In the case of a firm in financial distress,
the previous objection is accurate with respect to the psychic utility that
free assets provide to management; however, free assets will not produce
an increased effect on managerial performance because the firm's dire
status already controls managerial incentives for shirking. These
considerations suggest the following shapes for curves representing the
benefits of encumbering assets as related to the amount of encumbered
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Changes in the shape of the Beta Curve as Financial Status of the debtor changes.
The two types of costs associated with managerial preference for free
assets create two versions of the Sub-Optimal Use Theory, depending on
the relationship between secured loans and unsecured loans.77 (See Figure
5.)
If secured loans provide better fiscal terms for a debtor, including
savings in interest rates and the costs or benefits of covenants, (i.e., the
Theta Curve is negative) then the Sub-Optimal Use Theory provides that
the agency cost for managerial preference for free assets is equal to the
76 The curves are drawn without incorporating the noted possibility that the costs of free
assets might decrease after a certain point. This possibility does not impact any of the conclusions of
the present discussion.
77 I will provide a more complete discussion of the factors determining the desirability of a
secured loan in comparison to an unsecured loan in Part It.
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fiscal costs of management's selection of the inferior unsecured loan over
the secured loan in addition to the costs due to a lack of managerial
discipline caused by the availability of free assets. Graphically, the agency
costs are equal to the area between the Theta Curve and the Beta Curve. I
will call this condition the "Strong Form Sub-Optimal Theory."
Figure 5
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When 0% to 30% of the total value of the firm's assets are encumbered, the Strong Form Sub-
Optimal Use Theory obtains. When 30% to 65% of the total value of the firm's assets are
encumbered, the Weak Form Sub-Optimal Use Theory obtains. After 65%, use of unsecured debt
is efficient, but the benefit is only the area between the Beta and Theta Curves.
Secured loans may provide inferior fiscal results for a debtor (i.e., the
Theta Curve is positive). In such a case, it may be desirable nonetheless to
select a secured loan over an unsecured loan if the effects of the secured
loan on managerial behavior are sufficiently positive to negate the fiscal
costs of selecting the secured loan over the unsecured loan (i.e., if the Beta
Curve has a greater area than the Theta Curve over the given range). In
this scenario the Sub-Optimal Use Theory provides that the agency costs
are equal to the benefits of increased managerial discipline less the costs of
opting for a secured loan over an unsecured loan. Graphically, the agency
costs are equal to the area between the Beta Curve and Theta Curve. I will
call this condition the "Weak Form Sub-Optimal Use Theory."
If a secured loan is inferior to an unsecured loan when both fiscal
impact and managerial discipline are considered together, then
management's preference for free assets leads to an efficient choice and
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there are no agency costs in a practical sense; however, since free assets do
create some costs for the firm, the benefit of opting for secured debt is
only equal to the area between the Beta and Theta Curves.
2. The Problem with Debt
The interaction between financing strategies and agency costs
suggests an analytical limit to the achievable optimality of any debt
financing. Regardless of a debtor's financial status, the absence of free
assets exerts discipline over managerial behavior. Yet, if a debtor's
financial status makes secured debt an unviable financing option, then the
debtor confronts a trade-off between the benefits of security interests with
respect to disciplining managerial behavior and the costs of security
interests with respect to fiscal efficiency. The relative magnitudes of these
two factors determine the best strategy for the debtor; however, any
resolution is second-best, in the sense that the debtor must select between
managerial discipline and fiscal efficiency. An ideal scenario would be a
financing scheme that would permit the benefits of the unsecured loan to
coexist with the discipline of a lack of free assets.
78
II. The Supply of Secured Debt and Asset Securitization
In this Part, I will attempt to explain various observations concerning
the pricing of secured debt-primarily the low interest rate differential
between unsecured and secured loans for healthy debtors-through two
sets of comparisons. First, I will compare the benefits of secured debt to
financially healthy debtors and the benefits of secured debt to risky
debtors. Second, I will compare the mechanics of secured debt and the
mechanics of asset securitization for healthy debtors. Both comparisons
focus on the two primary determinants of the interest rates charged by
creditors, the risk of debtor default and the expected return in case of
default. These comparisons suggest a possible alternative to the Sub-
Optimal Use Theory, which I term the "Optimal Sub-Use Theory,"
according to which management's and shareholders' interests are
completely aligned with respect to secured debt, because secured debt is
not a viable financing option for most financially healthy firms.
A. Secured Debt for Healthy and Unhealthy Debtors
The benefits of secured debt result from its ability to increase the
expected return in case of debtor insolvency and decrease the likelihood of
78 I will argue in Part II that asset securitization may be viable alternative to this possibility.
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debtor insolvency. The costs associated with secured debt are the costs of
negotiating the contract, the costs of complying with covenants, and the
costs of foreclosure in case of debtor insolvency. While the mechanics of
secured debt are identical between financially healthy debtors and
marginal debtors, the magnitudes of the various costs and benefits
associated with secured debt differ dramatically between financially
healthy and risky debtors, creating a parallel difference in the viability of
secured debt as a financing instrument for the two types of debtors.
1. Benefits of Pledged Collateral
With respect to pledged collateral, there is no analytical reason why
the benefits of collateral would differ between financially healthy and
financially risky debtors. Secured debt increases a creditor's expected
return in case of debtor insolvency by dedicating a set of assets from the
debtor's pool of resources to pay the secured debt. Under a system of full
priority, the secured debt must be fully paid before any proceeds from
encumbered assets may be used to pay any other debt.7 9 Pledged collateral
is susceptible to an attack on the security interest by the bankruptcy trustee
or an attack on the priority of the security interest by other secured
creditors. Moreover, a debtor may decrease the value of a security interest
by failing to maintain the collateral or otherwise decreasing the value of
the collateral. However, there is no reason to believe, from an ex ante
perspective, that security interests with respect to assets of financially
healthy debtors are more or less susceptible to attacks from bankruptcy
trustees or other secured creditors. In addition, there is also no a priori
reason to believe that financially unhealthy debtors are more or less likely
to interfere with the value of pledged collateral. Consequently, the benefits
of pledged collateral are identical between financially healthy and
financially marginal debtors.
2. Benefits of Covenants
The benefits derived from covenants are inversely related to the
financial health of the debtor. In the case of risky debtors, where the
probability of insolvency is relatively high, covenants may potentially
either significantly decrease the probability of debtor insolvency or
substantially increase the creditor's power to obtain payment of debt
before the debtor becomes insolvent. Such benefits would be passed to the
debtor in the form of decreased interest rates. In the case of healthy
debtors, where the probability of insolvency is relatively low, covenants
79 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
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have only a limited effect for several reasons. First, given an absolute floor
of 0% chance of insolvency, a financially healthy debtor may be so far
from insolvency that there is not much room for improvement. For
example, even assuming a perfect set of covenants that can eliminate the
possibility of debtor insolvency or provide the creditor with a perfect
ability to avoid debtor insolvency, a debtor with only a 2% chance of
insolvency would only benefit by 2% whereas a debtor with 50% chance
of insolvency would benefit by 25 times more.
Second, the nature of firms suggests that covenants experience a
diminishing rate of return, meaning that the more healthy the firm, the less
effective the covenant. The solvency of a firm depends on controllable
variables (e.g., choice of ventures or financing strategies) in addition to
random variables (e.g., natural disasters or shifts in consumer tastes).
Covenants address the former class of factors. Assuming efficient use of
covenants, the least expensive measures against insolvency would be
exhausted first. Not only would a healthy firm derive little or no benefit
from potential covenants, potential covenants would have to be more
stringent or expansive (and thereby more expensive) to produce benefits
for the creditor.
This analysis suggests that healthy debtors stand to benefit much less
than risky debtors or not at all from the preventive powers of secured debt.
If debtors and creditors are rational, covenants will be efficient, meaning
that they will generate more benefits than costs. In light of the muted
benefits that healthy debtors may receive from the preventive covenants in
secured debt, it would appear that preventive covenants are not an efficient
choice for healthy debtors.
3. Costs of Secured Debt
Three types of costs are associated with secured debt. First, there are
contracting costs to form the secured debt, including the costs of
negotiating covenants and costs of properly perfecting a security interest.
Creditors confront these costs in lending on a secured basis to either
healthy debtors or risky debtors. Second, there are monitoring costs
associated with covenants aimed at protecting the value of the collateral.
To protect the value of its secured debt, a creditor almost always requires a
debtor to enter into covenants aimed at guaranteeing the value of the
encumbered assets.8° Collateral-specific covenants are employed in
secured loans irrespective of the financial condition of the debtor.8
Consequently, the interest rates of secured loans impound the contracting
80 See, e.g., ALLIANCE IMAGING, INC., supra note 48, at 66.
81 See id.
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costs and monitoring costs of creditors, regardless of the financial status of
the debtor.
Finally, a secured creditor confronts significant costs in collecting
secured claims from bankrupt firms. First, the secured creditor must
acquire legal counsel to represent it during the bankruptcy proceedings. If
the firm files under Chapter 11, bankruptcy proceedings can be quite
lengthy and require much representation as parties must negotiate their
rights under the reorganized firm.82 Second, the secured creditor incurs a
delay in receiving the claimed funds. On petition for bankruptcy, an
automatic stay is placed on all of the assets of the debtor.83 At best, this
stay requires a secured creditor to request that the automatic stay be lifted
in order to redeem its claim by liquidating the collateral.84 At worst, the
secured creditor will not be able to acquire its claim until the end of the
bankruptcy proceedings. Delays created by the bankruptcy proceeding not
only impose costs in terms of the time value of money, but also inject
volatility into the payment streams that creditors expect. Most importantly,
there is no manner for a secured creditor to protect itself against these
costs. The federal bankruptcy system is a mandatory system. Thus, while a
well-executed asset securitization confronts only minimal expected costs
in the case of an originator's bankruptcy,8" even the best secured loans
require substantial costs from the secured creditors in case of the debtor's
bankruptcy. Although healthy firms have a lower chance of entering
bankruptcy than risky firms, secured creditors of all bankrupt firms must
participate in the bankruptcy proceedings in order to protect their interests.
These substantial costs are passed on to the debtor in the form of increased
interest rates.
Initially, the observation that even healthy debtors must enter into
collateral-specific covenants appears to be at tension with the observation
that healthy debtors can often borrow on an unsecured basis at interest
rates that are no different from secured rates. If the chances of debtor
insolvency are so low so as to make the expected return in case of
insolvency a marginal consideration, then, a fortiori, the benefits gained
from increases in the expected return in case of insolvency from collateral
specific covenants would also be marginal. This suggests that the
monitoring and contracting costs of collateral-specific covenants may
dwarf the benefits provided by collateral-specific covenants in the case of
healthy debtors.
While this argument is cogent, it does not support removing
collateral-specific covenants in secured loans. The principle point of
82 See Bankruptcy Act of 1978, ch. 11, 11 U.S.C. §§1121-41 (2000).
83 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
84 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2000).
85 See discussion infra Part 11.
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differentiation between unsecured and secured debt is collateral. Without
collateral-specific covenants, a secured creditor would only have a
nominal right to certain collateral in case of default because the secured
creditor would not have any manner of ensuring that the debtor does not
dispose of the collateral or deplete the value of the collateral. Stripping a
secured loan of collateral-specific covenants would be equivalent to
transforming the secured loan into unsecured debt.
The inefficiency of collateral-specific covenants in the case of healthy
debtors suggests that healthy debtors would not prefer secured loans at all.
At least with respect to the benefits provided in terms of increased return
to creditors in case of insolvency, the costs of secured loans seem to
outweigh the benefits for healthy debtors because the likelihood of
insolvency is so low that even a significant increase in expected return is
discounted to the point of marginality (or at least to the point where they
cannot justify the costs of collateral-specific covenants).
A cost that is not reflected in the interest rate for secured loans but
that is incorporated into the debtor's decision on whether to employ a
secured loan is the cost of the covenant to the debtor. By limiting the
debtor's general behavior and use of the collateral, covenants impose two
types of costs. First, covenants may limit a debtor's freedom to expand its
business if doing so would violate a covenant (for example, by increasing
the debtor's debt-to-asset ratio beyond a certain limit). At the very least,
the debtor must acquire a secured creditor's consent before violating a
covenant. In the worst case, the debtor may have to share proceeds from a
new opportunity to coerce secured creditors into waiving covenants or it
may be unable to pursue lucrative opportunities at all if the creditors
choose not to waive the covenant. Second, covenants impose
administrative costs on the debtor. The debtor must monitor itself to ensure
that it complies with the covenants.
B. The "Choice" Between Secured Debt and Unsecured Debt
1. The Possibility of No Real Choice Between Secured and
Unsecured Debt
A common (but ultimately anecdotal) observation in the financial
industry is that risky debtors do not choose between secured and unsecured
debt. Rather, they choose between secured financing and no financing at
all.86 The previous discussions on the benefits of secured debt to healthy
and risky debtors suggest an interesting complement to this proposition.
86 See Harris & Mooney, Jr., supra note 32, at 2030-31; Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 442.
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Perhaps because secured debt is greatly demanded by risky debtors, it
seems to benefit risky debtors most. Indeed, depending on empirical data,
secured debt may be uniquely beneficial to risky debtors.
Juxtaposing the observations that the costs of covenants to debtors in
secured loans are not fully reflected in the interest rates charged by secured
creditors and that debtors will attempt to borrow on an unsecured basis
whenever possible seems to suggest that the costs of secured debt are so
great as to render secured debt not only as expensive as unsecured debt to
healthy firms but in fact more expensive. If creditors charge healthy firms
the same rate of interest for unsecured and secured loans and secured loans
contain the extra burden of covenants, then they would appear to exact
more cost from debtors, even abstracting from the opportunity costs of
encumbering assets. One mitigating point is that most unsecured loans, at
least from institutional creditors, also contain covenants.87 Yet, covenants
in unsecured loans lack the collateral-specific clauses of covenants in
secured loans. Moreover, the costs of such covenants are unclear because
they may impose conditions that debtors would independently fulfill. 88 In
light of these considerations, the case for unsecured debt being less
expensive than secured debt (even abstracting from opportunity costs) with
respect to financially healthy firms is most compelling for investment-
grade debt (which, generally does not contain covenants) and uncertain but
at least possible for other forms of unsecured debt.
Although the relative price of secured and unsecured debt is
ultimately an empirical issue, this tension suggests a quandary in the
pattern of debt. The previous analysis provides relatively strong support
for the observation that financially strong firms usually issue debt in the
form of bonds while risky firms employ secured debt. Firms that are able
to issue investment-grade debt stand to gain little from the preventive
powers of secured debt or the additional return to creditors in case of
insolvency, while risky firms benefit substantially. Because the costs of
secured debt are similar for both types of firms, in terms of contracting
costs, collection costs and costs associated with covenants, healthy firms
experience a negligible or nonexistent interest rate differential between
secured and unsecured debt while risky firms experience a significant
interest rate differential. This explains the preference of financially strong
firms for unsecured debt, but it leaves an intermediary class's preference
for unsecured debt as a puzzle. Specifically, firms that cannot issue
investment-grade bonds will often borrow from institutional investors on
an unsecured basis. As previously noted, such debt contains general
covenants, but not collateral-specific covenants. Consequently, these
87 See, e.g., ALLIANCE IMAGING, INC., supra note 48, at 66.
88 See id.
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unsecured loans do not provide the savings of investment-grade bonds in
terms of no costs of covenants. Yet, debtors almost uniformly prefer to
borrow on an unsecured basis, even when general covenants are present,
over a secured basis. The fact that some debtors benefit from covenants in
unsecured loans89 begs the question of whether they would benefit from
secured loans.
This issue serves as a fulcrum between the Sub-Optimal Use Theory
and the Optimal Sub-Use Theory. On the one hand, debtors' insistence on
unsecured debt, even when it involves covenants, may be understood as
evidence for the Sub-Optimal Use Theory. At first impression, the
observation that debtors will even sacrifice substantial savings in loan
interest rates in borrowing on an unsecured basis over a secured basis9
seems to support this proposition, the loss in savings from the higher
interest rates constituting an agency cost. Yet, the power of this
observation is limited because interest rates do not capture all of the costs
of covenants in secured loans to debtors. This suggests the alternative
possibility, that debtors' insistence on unsecured debt involving covenants
is efficient behavior. First, it may be that collateral-specific covenants
increase the cost of debt much more than general covenants. The interest
rate savings that debtors are willing to forsake could be less than the
marginal costs involved in engaging in the package of covenants involved
in secured loans instead of the regiment of covenants included in
unsecured loans. In support of this scenario is the possibility that the costs
of covenants in unsecured loans to debtors may often be marginal because
the debtors would have independently complied with such covenants.
2. Agency Costs and the Supply of Debt
The preceding assessment neglects the impact of fiscal strategy on
managerial behavior. Just as the mutual causality between fiscal strategy
and managerial discipline creates two forms of the Sub-Optimal Use
Theory, it also generates two forms of the Optimal Sub-Use Theory. The
Strong Form Optimal Sub-Use Theory obtains when a firm will benefit
from borrowing on an unsecured basis instead of a secured basis, and the
agency costs resulting from a lack of fiscal discipline on management are
less than the benefits from borrowing on an unsecured basis. Under the
Strong Form Optimal Sub-Use Theory, borrowing on an unsecured basis
results in an ultimate good for the firm. The Weak Form Optimal Sub-Use
Theory obtains when a firm benefits from borrowing on an unsecured
basis over a secured basis, but the agency costs due to a lack of fiscal
89 Assuming rational debtors and creditors, the presence of covenants should generate a
surplus in expected welfare.
90 See Mann, supra note 5, at 658 & n. 129.
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discipline on management are greater than the benefits of borrowing on an
unsecured basis (in other words, conditions identical to the Weak Form
Sub-Optimal Use Theory). Under the Weak Form Optimal Sub-Use
Theory, borrowing on an unsecured basis provides an ultimate cost to a
firm because the deleterious effects on managerial efficiency overwhelm
the benefits of borrowing on an unsecured basis. (See Figure 6.) The
Figure 6
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For this debtor, the Strong Form Optimal Sub-Use Theory obtains between encumberance levels of
100% and 65% of the total value of the firm's assets. When 65% to 30% of the total value of the
firm's assets are encumbered, the Weak Form Optimal Sub-Use Theory obtains. After 65%, use of
unsecured debt is efficient, but the benefit is only the area between the Beta and Theta Curves.
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This figure illustrates what the Beta and Theta Curve for a debtor for which the Strong Form
Optimal Sub-Use Theory obtains for every level of encumbrance. The problem of debt is
illustrated by the fact that the benefits of borrowing on an unsecured basis (the area below Theta)
is reduced by the deleterious effects of borrowing on an unsecured basis on managerial behavior
(the area below Beta).
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preceding analysis assessed only the fiscal benefits to financially healthy
firms. Consequently, it only counsels for the Strong Form Optimal Sub-
Use Theory by suggesting that the fiscal benefits of borrowing for
unhealthy firms seem to be substantial and therefore are more likely to
overwhelm costs due to negative effects on managerial behavior. (See
Figure 7.)
Firms that are sufficiently healthy to borrow on an unsecured basis,
but that are unable to issue investment-grade debt, present the most
questionable behavior. The uncertainty surrounding the ultimate
implications of issuance of investment-grade debt resides in the
relationship between decreased managerial effectiveness and fiscal
benefits. With respect to non-investment grade and unsecured debt, both
the insistence on borrowing on an unsecured basis as well as the relation
between the potential benefits of unsecured borrowing and resulting
agency costs are ambiguous. These transactions present the possibility of
either the Strong Form Optimal Sub-Use Theory, the Strong-Form Sub-
Optimal Use Theory or the Weak-Form Sub-Optimal Use Theory.
C. Secured Debt and Asset Securitization
1. Conceptual Similarities Between Secured Debt and Asset
Securitization
Many scholars have noted a fundamental conceptual similarity
between asset securitization and secured debt.91 At the heart of both asset
securitization and secured lending is the theoretical ability to generate
savings in the cost of capital by guaranteeing a creditor's claims even in
the contingency of bankruptcy. With respect to secured loans in a full
priority system of bankruptcy, the debtor guarantees that the secured
creditor will have a certain claim, regardless of the presence of other
unsecured or secured creditors, by pledging specific assets to a secured
creditor through a security interest. Asset securitization could be conceived
of as an even more extreme species of security interests. Rather than
merely pledging an asset to a secured creditor, a debtor converts assets into
capital market instruments.92 The firm receiving funds (the debtor, which
is referred to as an "originator") sells certain assets to a trust, corporation
or other legally distinct entity (a "special purpose vehicle" or "SPV").93 To
91 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887
(1994); Lupica, supra note 7.
92 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts are Greater than the Whole: How Securitization of
Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-
Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 139, 140.
93 See id. at 143-44.
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date, asset securitization has only involved receivables or other assets that
constitute present or future rights to payments.94 Shares of the SPV are
marketed to the public, and the SPV distributes funds to its shareholders
by collecting the receivables.95 The two requirements, that the conveyance
constitute a true sale and the SPV be a legally distinct entity, are aimed at
ensuring that the assets become completely disassociated from the
originator. Like secured debt, asset securitzation is aimed at separating the
returns to shareholders of the SPV (or secured creditors) from the
originator's (debtor's) financial status. In addition, from the perspective of
unsecured creditors, both secured debt and asset securitization have the
same effect of diluting their claims by decreasing the assets available in
case of the debtor's bankruptcy.96 To the extent that creditors adjust
interest rates ex post to a debtor's disposition of assets, secured debt and
asset securitization both impose the same cost to orginators/debtors-
higher interest rates from unsecured creditors. As both asset securitization
and secured debt involve a debtor pledging its assets in one form or
another, asset securitization is an ideal template for assessing the costs of
secured debt without reference to the specific costs (and benefits)
associated with liening assets.
2. Empirical Differences in the Use of Secured Debt and Asset
Securitization
The noted similarities between secured debt and asset securitization
do not carry through to debtors'/originators' use of the two forms of
financing. First, and most striking, is the difference between the trends in
use of asset securitization and secured debt. Asset securitization is the
fastest-growing form of capital formation in the United States, and its use
is expanding worldwide.97 In contrast, there has been no acceleration in the
use of secured debt. 98 An obvious reason for the differences in the trends
of use of asset securitization and secured debt is that asset securitization is
a relatively new innovation in secured financing.99 Independent of the
merits of the two forms of financing, the financial markets may be in the
process of absorbing the use of asset securitization. The steep upward
trend in the use of asset securitization may simply be symptomatic of an
94 See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 152-53.
95 See id. at 135-36.
96 See LoPucki, supra note 91; Lupica, supra note 7.
97 Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 133.
98 See James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's the
Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1377-80 (1998).
99 See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 133.
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emerging industry. 00 Second, and more important, is debtors' preference
for secured debt and asset securitization vis-A-vis unsecured debt. Most
debtors prefer to borrow on an unsecured basis if they can.'0 ' Perhaps the
strongest reason for this preference is that financially viable debtors enjoy
little or even no improvement when borrowing on a secured basis instead
of an unsecured basis. 0 2 Asset securitization appeals to both financially
healthy and risky originators.103 Risky originators receive an obvious
benefit of disassociating the value of the receivables from the risk of the
company; however, healthy originators may also benefit from securitizing
assets because the SPV may be able to issue securities with an even higher
investment grade rating than the originator' S.104 The differences in, the use
of secured debt and asset securitization by financially healthy firms
essentially stems from a different price for each form of financing. This
suggests that, while the two forms of financing are driven by the same
conceptual process, there are differences between secured debt and asset
securitization that create higher costs to debtors for the former and lower
costs to originators for the latter. Although the effects of this disparity are
prominent in the case of financially healthy firms, the difference in costs
of capital may apply to risky firms as well, creating a general preference
for asset securitization.
3. Differences in the Cost to Secured Creditors and SPV
Shareholders
If the market for debt and securities of SPVs is perfectly competitive,
then creditors and shareholders of SPVs are unable to systematically
achieve profits beyond a market-rate return on their investment. The prices
to debtors or originators of borrowing on a secured basis or raising funds
through securitization would reflect the costs to creditors or managers of
100 The rapid growth of asset securitization may seem to undermine the plausibility of the
Sup-Optimal Use Theory and support the Optimal Sub-Use Theory. If management prefers free assets
over free cash, then the enthusiasm for securitizing assets seems bewildering. Two related
considerations minimize the value of asset securitization in deciding between the Sup-Optimal Use
Theory and the Optimal Sub-Use Theory. First, to date, asset securitization has been limited to
receivables. This leaves a substantial amount of a firm's assets to serve as a safety mechanism for
management. However, this explanation alone is incomplete because management seems willing to
leave all assets unencumbered with respect to secured debt. This raises the second consideration-the
higher benefits to healthy firms from asset securitization. One of the reasons that free assets is a viable
agency cost is because of its low cost to shareholders due to the negligible difference between interest
rates for secured and unsecured debt. Asset securitization undercuts this benefit with respect to
receivables because it permits management to use receivables to finance projects at an interest rate that
is significantly better than unsecured debt. Asset securitization's limited scope and substantial benefits
to healthy debtors makes it consistent with the Sub-Optimal Use Theory.
101 See Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 448.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 442.
104 See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 137.
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SPVs plus a market-rate return. The disparity between pricing of secured
debt and securitized assets must originate from disparities in the costs to
creditors and managers of SPVs. The fact that creditors may be willing to
lend to a healthy firm on an unsecured basis at the same interest rate as a
secured basis not only indicates that asset securitization may be less costly
to many debtors but also that the costs attendant with secured loans eclipse
any benefits that financially healthy debtors would receive from such
loans.
The cost of debt to creditors is related to the chance of a debtor's
insolvency and the expected return on insolvency. As noted, scholars have
focused on the conceptual similarities between secured debt and asset
securitization with respect to the latter factor (mainly because of a focus on
the effects of both asset securitization and secured debt on unsecured
creditors).' °5 Yet, the literature has neglected the radical differences
between the two forms of financing from the perspective of reducing a
debtors' or originators' chances of insolvency. Moreover, the differences
in the costs of secured debt to secured creditors has been understated
because of a focus on the magnitude of claims and neglect of the costs of
collection. These differences in the mechanics of secured debt and asset
securitization potentially explain the different costs associated with the
two financing platforms.
As previously discussed, the covenants and collateral involved in
secured debt serve to aid the secured creditor in reducing the debtor's risk
of insolvency or at least in reducing the creditor's likelihood of
confronting debtor insolvency. Rather than decreasing the riskiness of the
originator, asset securitization attempts to minimize the effects of the
riskiness of the originator by legally divorcing the receivables from the
debtor. Since the originator sells the receivables to a legally distinct entity,
the entity has access to the receivables regardless of the solvency of the
debtor. Consequently, the value of securitized assets is almost completely
dependent on the expected value of the receivables. The reason why it is
not solely dependent on the expected value is that insolvency by the
originator may generate a challenge by the bankruptcy estate to the
legitimacy of the sale from the originator to the SPV. This risk can be
greatly mitigated by ensuring that the asset securitization accords with
judicial standards for a "true sale.' 0 6
The different tactics employed by asset securitization to control for
the risk of debtor insolvency answer the problems posed to secured debt by
financially strong debtors. Diminishing returns on the effectiveness of
covenants to enhance debtor behavior and the stochastic elements of any
105 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 91; Lupica, supra note 7.
106 Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 151.
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business enterprise create an effective limit on the ability of secured debt
to reduce the probability of debtor insolvency. Asset securitization could
be conceived as a radical development of the second strategy employed by
secured creditors-removing themselves from the debtor before
insolvency. In the case of asset securitization, the shareholders are always
removed from the originator. This simulates a secured loan that can
achieve a close to zero chance of insolvency for the debtor (the probability
is only close to zero because of the possibility of a challenge by a
bankruptcy trustee in case of debtor insolvency). Conversely, to the extent
that secured debt generates positive externalities by actually decreasing a
debtor's risk of insolvency, a risky debtor may prefer secured loans over
asset securitization. 1
07
In addition to the fundamentally different ways in which asset
securitization and secured debt address the probability of debtor
insolvency, the two forms of financing involve different mechanims for
ensuring the value of debt in case of debtor insolvency. Under a full
priority bankruptcy system, bankruptcy remoteness and a security interest
are identical in that they both guarantee the value of the pledged assets to
the creditor/SPV. The crucial difference lies in the cost associated with
collecting a claim once a debtor files for bankruptcy. Secured creditors
must incur costs of participating in bankruptcy proceedings. In the case of
asset securitization, the SPV is a legally distinct entity, and an originator's
bankruptcy should have no effect on the ability and costs of the SPV in
paying shareholders proceeds from liquidation of conveyed receivables. A
marginal exception is that originators often serve to collect receivables for
SPVs,'05 and the originator's bankruptcy may increase the costs of
collection if the SPV must hire a new collection agent. A more substantial
exception is that the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of the originator may
challenge the legitimacy of the sale from the originator to the SPV. This
possibility also creates some costs to managers of SPVs in terms of the
transaction costs of defending against such a challenge and the possibility
that such a challenge could succeed. Again, an SPV manager can
significantly reduce these costs by ensuring that the asset securitization
accords with established doctrines for a "true sale."10 9
Asset securitization also generates additional savings in terms of
eliminating the need to monitor collateral. An originator sells receivables
to an SPV in asset securitization, thereby placing the receivables under the
SPV's ultimate control (although the SPV may hire the originator to
administer the receivables). This obviates the need for monitoring because
the SPV manager controls the pledged assets.
107 This point is beyond the scope of this Article.
108 See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 148.
109 See id. at 143-44, 144 n.15.
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Of course, asset securitization involves unique costs as well, such as
the costs of creating an SPV, selling the receivables to the SPV and
marketing the shares of the SPV. However, the interest rates afforded to
debtors through asset securitization and secured loans strongly indicate
that, at least for healthy debtors, the unique costs to creditors associated
with secured loans are greater than the unique costs to managers of SPV's.
Moreover, the difference in interest rates understates the benefits to
debtors of asset securitization over secured loans in two ways. First, the
interest rate for secured debt does not reflect all of the costs to the debtor.
As discussed, secured loans involve covenants that generate costs to the
debtor that are not reflected in the interest rate charged. Asset
securitization does not generate costs associated with covenants to debtors.
Interestingly, because general accounting principles require that asset
securitization be recorded as a sale and not debt, 110 asset securitization
generates benefits to debtors by allowing them to raise capital without
negatively affecting their financial profile or violating existing
covenants.11 Second, comparing the interest rates of secured debt and
asset securitization exaggerates the costs of asset securitization because the
SPV manager receives less than a secured creditor. Asset securitization is
non-recourse while secured loans are full recourse. If the receivables sold
to an SPV fail to generate their expected value, then the SPV has no
recourse against the originator to make up the difference. Indeed, the
existence of recourse would significantly undermine the validity of the
conveyance of receivables from the originator to the SPV as a "true
sale."' 2 Collateral for a secured loan may depreciate, leaving the secured
creditor with an under-secured claim. However, the secured creditor still
has a claim against the debtor for the unsecured portion, and the
bankruptcy system allows a secured creditor to pursue the unsecured
portion of his debt as an unsecured creditor.1 3 These considerations
suggest that the incidental costs to secured creditors, the costs of
bankruptcy proceedings and covenants, are quite substantial.
Analytical considerations both support and refine this conclusion. The
increased costs of collection involved in secured debt in comparison to
asset securitization apply to both healthy and risky creditors. In both cases,
the increased costs of collection reduce secured creditors' expected
recovery in the case of insolvency. Yet, the preventive benefits of secured
110 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 77: Reporting by Transferors for Transferors of Receivables with Recourse, in I
ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS: FASB STATEMENT OF STANDARDS 755 (1995).
IIl See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 137. Although these benefits are generally recognized,
they may be merely transitional as creditors and investors react to the possibility that accounting
principles create a distorted image of the debtor's financial status.
112 See id. at 135.
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000).
Yale Journal on Regulation
debt do not apply as much to healthy debtors as they do to risky debtors.
The opposite may be true of asset securitization. First, asset securitization
substantially decreases the impact of debtor insolvency, simulating an
almost perfect chance of debtor solvency. Second, the risk in asset
securitization related to an originator's insolvency is the probability that a
bankruptcy estate trustee may challenge the sale of the receivables from
the originator to the SPV. Given that there is no reason to believe that
trustees of bankruptcy estates of healthy firms are somehow more likely to
challenge asset securitization than trustees of bankruptcy estates of risky
firms, the expected costs of asset securitization are lower for healthy firms
than risky firms. Beyond a certain level of debtor riskiness, the benefits of
asset securitization may begin actually to decrease because of the
significantly increased chances of challenges to the securitization.
114
4. Asset Securitization and the Problem of Debt
The Strong Form Optimal Sub-Use Theory and the Weak Form Sub-
Optimal Use Theory illustrate an inherent limitation of debt with respect to
financially strong debtors. Since fiscal strategy and managerial behavior
are interdependent, financially strong debtors must face the choice
between decreased managerial discipline and increased financial efficiency
through unsecured debt or increased managerial discipline but inefficient
financing through secured debt. Figures 3 and 4 above illustrate that the
opportunity costs of encumbering assets and the costs of free assets to
financially strong firms track each other to exacerbate this problem. At low
levels of encumbrance, where financially healthy firms have the strongest
incentives to encumber assets (i.e., the Theta Curve is at a high negative
value), the costs of free assets are also highest (i.e., the Beta Curve has a
high positive value), thereby negating much of the benefits from financing
on a secured basis. Additionally, the benefits of free assets and the
opportunity costs of encumbering assets exhibit complimentary trends in
relation to the amount of assets encumbered (both increasing), making a
general optimization strategy impossible and a specific optimization
strategy difficult (because the firm would have to rely on variances in the
rate of change of the two values in order to select an optimal strategy).
From a purely utilitarian perspective, the problem is also vexing
because one portion of the comparison, the consequences of the financing
choice, is reasonably clear, but the other portion, the consequences of lack
of fiscal discipline, is incredibly opaque. A pragmatic perspective
confounds the issue. Since managers are the agents who generally select
financing options (this may be implicit, since they negotiate the terms of
114 See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 137.
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financing, if not explicit), the consequences of financing strategy and lack
of managerial discipline are potentially, if not probably, distorted by
intentional obfuscation. Management's preference for free assets almost
assures that unsecured debt will be employed, and management's role in
developing the financing strategy of the firm veils the efficiency of the
choice for unsecured debt. Risky debtors that select secured debt seem to
reap the rewards of the healthy debtor's conundrum. Yet, this is only half-
true. While the debtor's situation strongly indicates that the decision to
encumber assets is efficient, it also marginalizes the effect of encumbered
assets on management as the debtor's financial distress itself would be a
powerful source of managerial discipline.
Although asset securitization does not cure the defects of secured debt
with respect to the healthy debtor, it does provide a viable choice to the
conundrum of secured and unsecured debt. Asset securitization provides
healthy debtors with the financial efficiency of unsecured debt (if not
greater financial efficiency) while simultaneously providing managerial
discipline (or at least facilitating managerial discipline) by decreasing
assets.
5. Revisiting Signals Associated with Secured Loans and Asset
Securitization
In attempting to differentiate full-recourse secured debt from non-
recourse secured-debt, Schwarcz appealed to the different signaling
consequences associated with liens and asset securitization. The present
analysis of creditors' costs associated with the two forms of financing
provides analytical content to Schwarcz's observations. The mere act of
granting a security interest does not indicate that a debtor is in financial
distress per se. Rather, the costs of secured loans created by the bankruptcy
system and the negligible benefits to healthy creditors from secured loans
have created the connection between secured debt and financial distress.
Healthy creditors do not enjoy much, if any, benefit from secured debt
because their costs of capital for unsecured debt rival those of secured debt
due to high collection costs to secured creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings. Yet, as a debtor becomes more risky, both the cost of
unsecured credit and the benefits of secured credit begin to increase.
Creditors charge a higher interest rate for unsecured debt because the
likelihood of insolvency increases. The benefits of secured debt increase
because the guaranteed claim in the case of insolvency becomes more
heavily weighted due to the higher probability of insolvency. Perhaps
more importantly, creditors will begin to benefit more from the leverage
over the debtor provided by a security interest. The point at which secured
debt becomes financially viable is when a debtor is sufficiently risky that
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the disparity between interest rates for unsecured debt and secured debt
has increased to the point where secured debt is attractive or the only
alternative. Security interests carry a negative signal because they indicate
that a debtor has become sufficiently risky that it must resort to the
relatively expensive vehicle of secured debt and can benefit from secured
creditors' implicit or explicit monitoring.
This analysis of the negative signal of secured debt also indicates why
asset securitization lacks the negative stigma of secured debt. Asset
securitization does not incorporate the high costs of collection in the
bankruptcy process, and it provides debtors with considerable benefits
over unsecured debt. Financially healthy debtors may decide to securitize
their assets even if unsecured debt is available if the interest savings
outweigh the opportunity costs of possessing free assets. Since the benefits
of asset securitization begin to wane after a certain level of firm riskiness
due to the increased possibility of a challenge from a bankruptcy trustee,
asset securitization may actually carry a positive signal about a firm's
strength. Regardless of this possibility, asset securitization does not
provide the same information on a debtor's costs of unsecured debt as
encumbering assets.
III. Implications and Suggestions for Policy
A. A Possible Problem with Full Priority
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have recently argued that granting
secured creditors full priority in bankruptcy proceedings generates
inefficient and purely redistributional secured debt."15 Empirical data and
analytical considerations with respect to debtor demand for secured debt
and creditor supply of secured debt have shifted the analysis of the
efficiency of full priority a full 180 degrees. A problem may exist with
respect to secured debt under the current full priority bankruptcy system.
Yet, the problem is not an over-use of secured debt as Bebchuk and Fried
argue, but an underuse of secured debt. From a demand-side perspective,
managers are biased against secured loans because they desire the safety
provided by available free assets. Supply-side factors feed this bias by
creating a marginal or zero interest rate differential between secured and
unsecured debt for debtors who have a choice between the two forms of
debt. Full priority in theory does not create full priority in reality because
of the costs of covenants and collection attendant with secured debt. More
importantly, Bebchuk and Fried neglect the preventive powers of secured
115 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 4.
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debt. While there is a possibility that full priority creates redistributional
opportunities involving security interests, the inefficiencies of secured debt
overwhelm any redistributional benefits for healthy creditors. The Optimal
Sub-Use Theory holds that the significant costs and muted benefits of
secured debt lead to an efficient choice for unsecured debt, even in light of
redistributional opportunities. The Sub-Optimal Use Theory holds that this
situation exacerbates the agency costs associated with corporations or the
costs of risk aversion associated with manager-owners because it makes
free assets an ideal medium for excess wealth.
Yet, debtors' preference for unsecured debt is only potentially a
problem. The crucial point is the supply-side issue of whether the bias
against secured debt is a product of the inherent and unavoidable traits of
secured debt or a loss due to current government regimes. 16 The issue is
important because it impacts how the preference for unsecured debt should
be perceived and the possibility of remedying the situation.
The costs associated with secured debt can be roughly categorized
into four classes: investigation of the debtor and collateral, costs of
covenants, perfection costs and collection costs. The latter two classes of
costs are heavily regulated and therefore affected by the Uniform
Commercial Code and Federal Bankruptcy Law, respectively. Although
the current analysis suggests that healthy debtors' preference for unsecured
debt is ultimately rooted in the aggregate costs of secured debt, it does not
suggest which factors, if any, are dominant. If the decreased benefits of
secured debt were the primary factor in healthy creditors' preference for
unsecured debt, then the preference for unsecured debt emanates from the
nature of secured debt itself. Yet, if preference for unsecured debt is
mainly attributable to the high collection costs imposed by the bankruptcy
regime or high perfection costs created by the Uniform Commercial Code,
then it is a distortion created by a social institution. The resolution of this
issue requires empirical work that is beyond the scope of this Article;
however, the issue is important in at least two respects. First, the issue
impacts whether preference for unsecured debt should be considered a
necessary consequence of security interests or a cost of current regulation.
This insight has evident consequences for the desirability of current
regulatory systems. Second, the issue impacts whether the preference for
unsecured debt can be addressed by legal changes. If the bias against
secured debt arises mainly from the relevant regulatory systems, then
changes in those systems may ameliorate the situation. The desirability of
such changes should be considered in light of their potential costs with
respect to the goals of the current regimes.
116 It is premature to consider the loss a deadweight loss because the costs of encumbrance
and collection may be unavoidable and the benefits of the government regimes may outweigh such
costs.
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B. Secured Debt and Asset Securitization as Substitutes
The current emphasis by some scholars on the similarities between
secured debt and asset securitization suggests two possible responses to the
issues raised thus far. The first and least plausible response is that the
current preference for unsecured debt over secured debt is invalid due to a
form of myopia towards debt. Rather, the current preference for unsecured
debt is a residual effect created by asset securitization. The benefits of
asset securitization over secured debt and its substitutability with secured
loans has transformed the choice between secured and unsecured debt to a
choice between secured debt and asset securitization. This response is
inaccurate on theoretical, empirical and historic fronts. Asset securitization
and secured loans both involve the pledging of collateral, but they involve
very different costs and benefits. Asset securitization offers the benefits of
bankruptcy remoteness while generating the costs of the sale and
securitization of the assets. Secured loans offer the preventive benefits
afforded by credible foreclosure threats and priority in bankruptcy while
creating bankruptcy representation costs and monitoring costs.
Empirically, the two forms of financing coexist, and their coexistence is
not a transitional phenomenon." 7 Secured loans offer significant benefits
to risky debtors that asset securitization cannot provide. Secured loans
attempt to reduce the risk of default by controlling debtor behavior while
asset securitization limits the effect of default by removing the collateral
from the debtor. Consequently, secured loans provide a level of debtor
discipline that asset securitization does not attempt to address. Finally, the
puzzle of debtor preference for unsecured debt in light of the benefits of
secured debt was observed before the prominence of asset securitization. 1
8
The second possibility is that while asset securitization may not be the
cause for secured debt's relative unpopularity, it may serve as a remedy for
secured debt's shortcomings. This response is especially appealing in light
of how asset securitization complements secured debt. Asset securitization
provides benefits to healthy creditors while secured debt's benefits are
most pronounced with risky debtors. Unfortunately, this response
encounters several objections as well.
From an economic perspective, the ways in which asset securitization
and secured debt operate create deep incompatibilities between the two
forms of financing. The benefits from asset securitization originate from
the sale of collateral to a legally distinct entity or the partitioning of some
set of the firm's anticipated cash flow to an SPV. In contrast, one of the
primary benefits of secured debt is that it permits debtors to
117 See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 133.
118 See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 7-30.
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simultaneously employ the same asset as collateral and an input of
production. This difference in mechanics is perhaps the most significant
economic reason why asset securitization has been limited to rights to
payment. Assets constituting rights to payment are generally partitioned
from a firm's other processes (thus allowing bankruptcy remoteness), and
the securitization of rights to payment often creates little functional change
in the operation of the firm as the SPV usually employs the originator to
collect the payments.
While the scope of asset securitization is increasing to include a wider
range of rights to payment in addition to the receivables (such as project
finance)," 9 two problems plague securitizing a firm's general assets. First,
on a conceptual level, it would be very difficult to reduce general assets
(such as non-project-specific office buildings or non-project-specific
equipment) to a right for payment. Such a feat would require somehow
assessing the value that the object contributed to the value of the general
endeavor, and the transaction costs involved in such an endeavor would
almost certainly eclipse any benefits. Thus, asset securitization is ideal for
assets or groups of assets that constitute a present or future stream of cash
flow (of course, expanding the scope of asset securitization to the limit-
securitizing the firm, would be to simply reduce asset securitization to
equity in a firm). Second, to achieve bankruptcy remoteness, asset
securitization requires that assets be transferred to a bankruptcy remote
SPV. Again, the transaction costs involved in creating an SPV for general
assets and somehow permitting the SPV to allow the originator to use the
assets while still maintaining control of the assets, although perhaps not as
significant as possible benefits, would be substantial nonetheless. Such an
arrangment effectively simulates an originator leasing, instead of owning,
an asset. Assuming rational and informed originators, the current
ownership of the assets strongly indicates that leasing was an overall
inferior strategy. The nature of asset securitization essentially limits it to
assets or groups of assets that generate a stream of value that can be easily
separated from the remainder of the debtor. This creates substantial
differences between the scope of asset securitization and secured debt.
Legal limitations with respect to asset securitization support the
boundaries created by economic considerations. One of the primary
strands in the jurisprudential development of asset securitization has been
the distinction between asset securitization and secured debt (specifically,
a floating lien-asset securitization usually involves receivables). 20 The
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Uniform Commercial Code analyzes transactions based on their substance
not form.12' This analytical approach creates substantial restrictions on
how an originator may organize sales to an SPV. It is not sufficient that an
originator create the mere appearance of a sale. The transaction must have
the substance of a sale. Jurisprudence has focused on the issues of
recourse, originator's retained rights, pricing and control over the sold
assets.2 Essentially, the sale from an originator to an SPV must result in
the SPV possessing both sufficient power over the securitized assets and
sufficient risks associated with the securitized assets so as to approximate
the situation of the SPV owning the securitized asset. The true sale
requirement creates a substantial obstacle to any arrangements whereby
corporations might attempt to sell assets to an SPV and then re-lease them.
Courts may pierce the fagade of the arrangement and deem the actual
transaction as a secured loan from the SPV to the originator.
Conclusion
The demand and supply of debt and structured financing are the nexus
of a myriad of intricate forces, such as the agency costs affecting and
resulting from any financing scheme and the impact of the debtor's
financial health on the operation of any financing scheme. The disconnects
between previous theories on secured debt and asset securitization and
observed practices with respect to these forms of financing, as illustrated
by the paradox of secured debt and the disparity between the popularity of
secured debt and asset securitization, are a direct result of previous
theories' failure to recognize the essential complexity underlying financing
decisions and the unique dynamics driving different species of financing.
Analytical considerations alone cannot answer the questions surrounding
the efficiency of the observed levels of secured debt and asset
securitization. Indeed, a purely theoretical approach cannot even determine
if any problems exist at all.
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